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STRUCTURE ON CHANGE OF ATTITUDE
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Today, people in the field of public address or 
rhetoric spend a considerable amount of time attempting to 
describe what they do. Exactly what is the study of speech? 
Donald Bryant was answering this question when he concluded 
that the rhetorical function is "the function of adjusting 
ideas to people and of people to i d e a s . E v e n  though this 
answer focuses on the root of the problem, three rather 
vague concepts still exist: the nature of ideas, the nature
of adjustment, and the more difficult nature of people. The 
student of rhetoric often attempts to understand this art 
described by Bryant by separating the components— ideas.
^Donald C. Bryant, "Rhetoric: Its Function and
Scope," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXXIX, No. 4 (1953), 
402.
adjustment and people--when they are, in fact, inseparable.
The study of speech is a study of the individual.
The study of speech behavior is the study of verbal responses
of the individual to various stimuli.
Speech is the fundamental aspect of the whole person­
ality. Its function is not only to communicate 
verbally, but is also an expression of the individual's 
relations to himself and to others. The more man 
tends toward health and self-realization, the less he 
will tend toward neurosis, and the more meaningful 
will be his verbalization.%
Barbara continues by pointing out that verbal communication
between a person and his environment is the most basic means
of expressing the characteristics of personality.
Since speech is recognized as the way people adapt
to each other, it is surprising to find so few studies in
the professional journals which attempt to understand speech 
behavior by investigating the relationships between the 
different communicating personalities.
In the history of the nature of ideas, adjustment, 
and people, a close relationship emerges between the sources 
of rhetorical theory and personality theory. Both rhetorical 
and personality theory often refer to Aristotle, Plato, and
^Dominick A. Barbara, Your Speech Reveals Your Per­
sonality (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1958),
pp. 160-161.
other classical figures as the originators of contemporary 
theory. In rhetoric, when we talk of "audience analysis," 
we go back to the suggestion of Aristotle that we ought 
". . .to understand human character and goodness . . ."^ or 
Plato's advice that " . . .  the man who aims to be an artistic 
speaker must necessarily know the soul in all its species . .
. ."^ In view of this we should not be too surprised when 
we discover that Freud, greatly impressed by Plato's theory 
of reminiscence, " . . .  wove suggestions of Plato's into his 
book. Beyond the Pleasure P r i n c i p l e , " 5  or when Hall and 
Lindzey state, "A comprehensive view of the development of 
personality theory must surely begin with conceptions of man 
advanced by the great classical scholars as Hippocrates, 
Plato, and A r i s t o t l e . Apparently, then, rhetoric and per­
sonality theory share a common heritage.
The idea of relating personality theory to rhetorical
^Aristotle, Rhetorica. Ed. Richard McKeon, trans.
W. Rhys Roberts (New York: Random House, 1941), 1356& 20.
4piato, Phaedrus, trans. Lane Cooper (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1948), p. 61.
^Ernest S . Jones, The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud 
(New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1953), p. 56.
^Calvin S . Hall and Gardner Lindzey, Theories of 
Personality (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1957),
p . 2.
theory became evident during the early part of this century. 
Robert West typifies the rhetorical theorist's concern, dur­
ing the early twenties, with the importance of examining 
human thought and conduct.
Speech concerns itself always with human conduct and 
thoughts, always with the changing or adapting of the 
thoughts of one person or groups of persons to those 
of another person or group. Before we can consider 
therefore, the problem of making this adaptation 
consciously through the means of speech, we must know 
a great deal about the thing we are trying to adapt; 
that is, we must study the principles of human thought 
and conduct.7
West concluded that "no other study is more clearly applied 
psychology than the study of public speaking."® Some other 
rhetorical theorists of this era who shared West's feelings 
include: Winans, Woolbert, Phillips, etc.^ Practically all
of the present texts in public speaking show evidences of 
the impact of psychological theory upon speech theory. It 
is not unreasonable, therefore, to expect to find areas in
7Robert West, Purposive Speaking (New York: Mac­
Millan Co., 1924), p. 13.
®Ibid., p. 17.
^James Albert Winans, Public Speaking (New York:
The Century Co., 1917); Charles Henry Woolbert, The Funda­
mentals of Speech: A Behavioristic Study of the Underlying
Principles of Speaking and Reading (New York: Harper and 
Bros., 1920); Arthur Edward Phillips, Effective Speaking 
(Chicago: The Newton Co., 1929).
modern personality research which may contribute to the 
amplification and extension of rhetorical theory.
Purpose of the Study
This study will utilize precepts from both rhetoric 
and personality theory. From rhetoric, the fundamental con­
cept of ethos serves as one factor. Ethos should be under­
stood as the term in rhetoric equivalent to the psychologist’s 
term, ’’source credibility.” According to Hovland, the two 
main components of source credibility are the perceived 
trustworthiness and expertness of the s p e a k e r . From per­
sonality theory, the concept of dogmatism is another factor. 
The concept of dogmatism used in this study is defined by 
Rokeach as :
. . .  a closed way of thinking which would be associ­
ated with any ideology regardless of the content, an 
authoritarian outlook on life, an intolerance toward 
those with opposing beliefs and a sufferance of those 
with similar beliefs.
According to this view, dogmatism, or the lack of it, is more
than an attitude or a trait; it is to be understood as a
total belief system or as a structuring of personality.
1®C. I. Hovland, I. L. Janis, and H. H. Kelley, 
Communication and Persuasion (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1953), p. 35.
llMilton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind (New 
York: Basic Books, Inc., 1960), pp. 4-5.
By investigating the relationships between these 
concepts from rhetoric and personality theory, we may be 
able to leam more about the communication situation. Spe­
cifically this study will attempt to leam whether the belief 
system of the speaker, the belief system of the audience and 
the relationship of these belief systems are significant 
factors in the persuasive situation. It will also"study the 
effect of ethos or source credibility on different belief 
systems and the interaction of ethos with these belief 
systems.
Justification of the Study
A number of studies have investigated the character­
istics of audiences; still others have sought to determine 
the persuasive effects of various attributes of the speaker. 
Many of these studies, although replicated numerous times, 
have produced inconclusive results. For example, Anderson 
and Clevenger note that "experimental findings have not yet 
reached the numbers and the sophistication necessary to form 
definitive conclusions about the operations of ethical 
p r o o f . "12 Note also the contradictory findings in the
l^Kenneth Anderson and Theodore Clevenger, Jr., "A 
Summary of Experimental Research in Ethos," Speech Mono­
graphs, XXX (1963), 50-78.
7recency-primacy investigations.^^
Perhaps one of the reasons for the inconclusive re­
sults lies in the emphasis or point of focus. Most investi­
gations tend to consider groups, whether speakers or 
listeners, as a single entity, motivated by a few select 
desires, possessing similar attitudes, and ready to respond 
as a whole. In reality, these groups are but collections of 
individuals, each of them uniquely susceptible to the vari­
ous means of persuasion.
It seems practical, therefore, to shift the primary 
focus of previous investigations which have concentrated on 
either speaker-centered or audience-centered research. This 
new focus is on the relationships existing between the per­
sonality structures of the speaker and the personality 
structures of the listeners. The concern, then, is with the 
relationships of the individual to other individuals rather 
than individual to a group considered as one homogeneous 
whole.
Approach of the Study 
The rather holistic approach of this study attempts
13See Hovland, Janis, and Kelley, o£. cit., or C. I. 
Hovland, Order of Presentation in Persuasion (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1957).
8to unify and correlate various manifestations of speech 
theory and behavior. In this type of study, the attitude of 
the investigator, when overly concerned with methodological 
techniques and instruments, is sometimes contradictory to 
his purpose, i.e., obtaining valid results. The danger is 
that obsession with the reliability and methodology of the 
study sometimes obscures the nature of the object studied. 
Conclusions may be qualified, but the fact that the conclu­
sions represent only one facet of a complex form of behavior 
studied in isolation is sometimes ignored. In making this 
criticism specific to personality theory, Gordon Allport 
commented:
Devotion to the microscope and to mathematics has led 
investigators to shun complex, patterned forms of 
behavior and thought, even though it is in these com­
plex forms that personality can be said to exist at 
all. Bullied by the instruments of physics, many 
psychologists neglect the most delicate recording in­
strument ever devised for the relating and proper 
clustering of facts— namely, their minds.^
This statement might also apply to the current status of re­
search in speech. For example, there is a tendency to study 
logical impact or effect apart from the emotional impact of 
words. When qualities, such as logic and emotion, are
^^Gordon W. Allport, Personality and Social En­
counter (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), p. 9.
studied apart from their sources, the investigator tends to 
attribute to them an existence all their own. The more a 
characteristic is concentrated upon in this manner, the more 
it is reified or the greater becomes the separation between 
that quality and others which are legitimately inseparable 
from it.
In short, the approach in this study is a relatively 
holistic approach which attempts first to consider speech as 
an entire process and second to unify and correlate various 
manifestations of speech theory and behavior. In a holistic 
approach to the study of a persuasion situation the concept 
of belief systems appears to be a promising tool. This 
study will make use of this tool in describing the general 
characteristics of both the speaker and the listeners. It 
will also use the rhetorical notion of ethos in order to ex­
plore its effect on various types of belief systems.
Summary
Thus, this study considers speech as a unitary proc­
ess. In addition to studying the significance of the struc­
ture of an individual's belief system in a persuasive 
situation there are perhaps a number of related questions in 
rhetorical theory that might be answered through this
10
approach. Some of these possible questions are:
1. Can psychological theories provide rhetoric with 
new insights into the analysis of speech behavior?
2. Can speech behavior be studied without first em­
ploying rhetorical categories which lead, at times, 
to the reification of those categories?
3. Does the personality have an influence upon speech 
behavior, and can personality be discovered through 
an analysis of speech behavior?
4. Is it_,profitable in the study of speaking to assume 
that the relationship between the personality of 
the speaker and the personality of the listener 
affects the nature of speech response as much as 
does the personality of the audience and/or the 
personality of the speaker?
5. Are the rhetorical concepts of style, ethos, 
arrangement, etc., reflections or manifestations 
of personality process?
In summary, the present study is wide in its scope, 
encompassing the categories into which the study of speaking 
is commonly divided. The rationale for this breadth stems 
from the assumption that a proper- object of inquiry in speech 
is the entire speaker-listener relationship. Another assump­
tion is that all the manifestations of speech behavior are 
significantly interrelated; to separate them destroys some 
of the consistency and meaningful aspects of the speech 
process.
CHAPTER II
THE PROBLEM
This study is concerned with the significance of 
ethos and belief systems in the persuasive situation. In 
order to study the significance of these concepts it is 
necessary to review some past and current thinking about 
ethos and belief systems. This chapter will, therefore, 
consider (1) the concept of ethos in ancient rhetoric, 
medieval rhetoric, and contemporary theory and (2) belief 
systems as viewed by A. H. Maslow, Erich Fromm, Adomo et 
al., and Milton Rokeach. After tracing the major patterns 
of these concepts, specific hypotheses to be tested will be 
formulated.
The Role of Ethos in Rhetorical Models
Ancient Rhetoric
Of Greek origin, the word ethos originally meant 
customs or usages, particularly those which pertained to one
11
12
group as contrasted with another. Later, the term came to 
mean disposition or character and gained a connotation of 
societally approved characteristics.^
Sattler identified the concept of ethos in the rhe­
torical theory of Corax and Tisias as the function of the 
proem and in the topics of probability; in the Greek logog- 
raphers as the adaptation of a speech to the speaker, audi­
ence and subject; and in the ^  Alexandrum as a form of proof 
with emphasis upon adaptation of narration and arguments to 
the audience to enhance the probability of the argument.%
Isocrates repeatedly stressed the role of character
and virtue in persuasion and the value of a good reputation:
. . . who does not know that words carry greater 
conviction when spoken by men of good repute than 
when spoken by men who live under.a cloud, and that 
the argument which is made by a man's life is of 
more weight than that which is furnished by words.^
In the dialogue Gorgias, Plato attacked rhetoric as 
a false art practiced by men who lacked full understanding 
of the subject on which they spoke. The true philosopher,
^William Sattler, "Conceptions of Ethos in Rhetoric." 
Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation (Northwestern University, 
1941), p. 5.
^Ibid., pp. 45-48.
^Isocrates, Antidosis, trans. George Norlin (London: 
William Heinemann Ltd., 1929), II, 339.
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the wise, intelligent, informed seeker of the truth was held 
to be the ideal.^ In the Phaedrus Plato indicated the ele­
ments of a superior rhetoric in which good character, not the 
appearance of good character, would be the hallmark of the 
speaker. Because the true philosopher desired to advance 
truth, he had to know the "soul" of his auditors to.,make the 
truth maximally persuasive.5
Summarizing ethos prior to Aristotle, Sattler noted 
that much emphasis was placed upon the "appearance" of good 
character and the special value of ethos in a proem, with 
some emphasis upon the importance of the "moral" speaker and 
the direct or indirect application of ethos as a mode of 
proof.G
Aristotle recognized that persuasion consisted of
three parts, which he called ethos, logos, and pathos. He
felt that ethos had great importance in persuasion:
It is not true, as some writers assume in their
treatises on rhetoric, that the personal goodness 
revealed by the speaker contributes nothing to 
his power of persuasion; on the contrary, his 
character may almost be called the most effective
^Plato, pp. 95-206.
5lbid., pp. 7-71.
^Sattler, pp. 328-329.
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means of persuasion he possesses.^
Writers before Aristotle had implied the existence of such 
a power of persuasion but none had positively identified it. 
Aristotle was the first to analyze the constituents of ethos.
There are three things which inspire confidence 
in the orator’s own character— the three, namely, 
that induce us to believe a thing apart from any 
proof of it: good sense, good moral character, and
goodwill.8
Aristotle further explained what he meant by these compo­
nents of ethos by discussing Liberality, Justice, Courage, 
Temperance, Wisdom, Magnanimity, Magnificence, Prudence, and 
Gentleness.
In summary, Aristotle viewed artistic ethos as that 
element of proof which resulted from impressions of the 
speaker derived from a variety of sources during the speech, 
and, more particularly, those impressions relating to judg­
ments of the character, intelligence, or good will of the 
speaker. Prior impressions of the speaker were recognized 
but not classified within the Aristotlian system of rhetori­
cal proofs.
Cicero and Quintilian generally preserved the 
Aristotelian view of ethos, although particular emphases of
^Rhetorica, 1356& 10.
8lbid., 1378& 6.
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their own were added. Cicero did not place as much emphasis 
upon ethos as Aristotle did. He employed the concept largely 
under the term "character," and treated ethos as a way of win­
ning the favor of the audience.^  He also emphasized reputa­
tion as a factor of ethos
Both Quintilian and Cicero stressed the importance 
of adaptation to audience and occasion by the speaker in re­
lation to ethos and emphasized the doctrine of decorum or 
appropriateness as a factor in evincing ethos. In contrast 
to Aristotle, Quintilian gives less attention to ethos as a 
function of invention and more to the value of prior 
reputation.
Medieval Rhetoric 
During the medieval period, from approximately the 
fourth through the fourteenth century, such rhetorical theory 
as existed was largely preserved and presented by the clergy 
with special adaptation to homiletics as in Book IV of De 
Doctrine Christiana by St. Augustine. Ethos was frequently
Q
Irving J. Lee, "Some Conceptions of Emotional Ap­
peal in Rhetorical Theory," Speech Monographs, VI (1939), 67.
^^Sattler, pp. 166-167.
lllbid., pp. 165-169.
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held to be established through decorum in style and 
delivery
The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries marked a 
comparatively full redevelopment of the classical tradition 
of ethos. The works of Quintilian, Cicero, and Aristotle 
were widely cited in this period, normally with approbation. 
Whately, concerned primarily with preaching, believed that 
morality and virtue must be the basis for sound speaking. 
Blair specifically urged the young speaker not to speak on 
both sides of an issue, even for practice, for this might 
harm his reputation and thus his fut u r e . C a m p b e l l  placed 
emphasis upon "sympathy" which he defined as "the opinion 
entertained of him [the speaker] by the hearers, or the 
character which he bears with them."^^ Sympathy, according 
to Campbell, may be lessened several ways, chiefly by these 
two: by a low opinion of his intellectual abilities and by
a bad opinion of his morals.
l^Ibid., pp. 190-191.
^^Richard Whately, Elements of Rhetoric (New York: 
Sheldon and Co., 1846), p. 21.
^^ugh Blair, Lectres on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres 
(Philadelphia: James Kay and Brother, 1829), p. 287.
^^George Campbell, The Philosophy of Rhetoric 
(London: William Tegg and Co., 1859), pp. 96-97.
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The Elocution Movement was developing rapidly during 
this era, particularly in America. While this tradition was 
a powerful one, it did not affect the theory of ethos except 
indirectly, by ignoring it in all applications except char­
acter portrayal.
Writers in the homiletical tradition frequently 
viewed the preacher as an "inspired individual" and thus 
gave less emphasis to techniques to develop ethos.
In summary, from Quintilian to the twentieth century, 
ethos lost a place in models of the rhetorical process; then, 
despite individual variations and excepting writers in the 
homiletical tradition, it regained a place in rhetoric as ex­
tensive as that which it held in ancient rhetorical systems.
Contemporary Theory
Among contemporary writers, we note a striking paral­
lel between the classical concept of ethos and the modem 
concept of the speaker's personality as viewed..by Oliver. 
Aristotle conceived the speaker's personality as having 
three parts: (1) character, (2) intelligence, and (3) good
will. Oliver also notes three parts : (1) reputation, (2)
^^Robert T. Oliver, The Psychology of the Persuasive 
Speech (New York: Longman's, Green, and Co., 1942), p. 94.
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general knowledge, and (3) the speaker's feelings toward 
himself, his audience, and his s u b j e c t . W h e n  all of these 
factors are combined in the public speaker and are presented 
to an audience through a speaker, personality or ethos is at 
work.
Considerable research in ethos or source credibility 
has now been done. Many studies have concerned themselves 
with segments of the overall problem, especially in the area 
of the source's influence on the attitude shift toward a con­
cept. Typical of such studies have been those in "prestige 
suggestion"^® or "source credibility."^9 Most of these 
studies have demonstrated that the perception of the source 
may have a significant effect on the opinions and attitudes 
of the recipients. Thus, when the source is held to be one 
of high credibility, subjects tend to change their judgments 
of the concepts in the direction of the source's assertion. 
Conversely, when the source is held to be one of low esteem 
or credibility there seems to be less effect in modifying
l?Ibid.
^®S. E. Asch, "The Doctrine of Suggestion, Prestige 
and Imitation in Social Psychology," Psychological Review, 
LV (1948), 250-276.
^^Hovland, Janis, and Kelley,
19
the recipients' "attitude" than was experienced with a
source of high credibility.
Previous research studies of source credibility fall
into two rather clear divisions. These are defined by
Anderson and Clevenger as Extrinsic and Intrinsic Ethos.
Intrinsic credibility [ethos] is a change in the "image" of
the communicator that takes place while the communicator is
speaking. This type of credibility was studied by Wayne N.
91Thompson. He found that a group of college students 
raised their opinion of Thomas E. Dewey after hearing a cam­
paign speech.
Extrinsic credibility is that attitude toward the 
message source which exists before the presentation of the 
message. This investigation will attempt to manipulate two 
components of this extrinsic credibility, i.e., trustworthi­
ness and expertness so that one source will be considered 
highly-credible while the other is highly un-credible. Hov- 
land points out that these are important variables.
In summary, the research evidence indicates that 
the reactions to a communication are significantly
^^Anderson and Clevenger, 50-78.
2^Wayne N. Thompson, "A Study of the Attitude of 
College Students Toward Thomas E. Dewey Before and After 
Hearing Him Speak," Speech Monographs, XVI (1949), 125-134.
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affected by cues as to the communicator's Intentions, 
expertness, and trustworthiness . . . .
From the results, it is not possible to disentangle 
the effect of the two main components of credibility—  
trustworthiness and expertness--but it appears that 
both are important v a r i a b l e s . 22
From the above review, it is obvious that ethos 
[credibility] has played an important part in studies of 
persuasion. In view of the importance of ethos, this study 
attempts to analyze the effect of varying degrees of credi­
bility and the persuasive relationship between ethos and 
belief systems.
Belief Systems
Another dimension of this study is the belief system 
or personality structure of the audience. "Personality" 
seems to be one of those words like "truth" and "socialism" 
that means all things to all men. Its usage defies defini­
tion. Cicero was among the first to employ the term persona 
(a Latin equivalent), and even in his time it possessed at 
least four meanings: (1) as one appears to others (but not
as he really is); (2) the part someone (e.g., a philosopher) 
plays in life; (3) the assemblage of personal qualities that 
fit a man for his work; and (4) distinction and dignity (as
^^Hovland, p. 35.
21
in style of w r i t i n g ) . 23
Allport, in the most extensive treatment of the term 
in psychological literature, lists fifty current definitions 
for the words "person" and "personality." He summarizes the 
problem in the preface of his book.
Personality is one of the most abstract words in 
our language, and like any abstract word suffering from 
excessive use, its connotative significance is very 
broad, its denotative significance negligible. Scarcely 
any word is more v e r s a t i l e . 24
In this study, the term "personality" is used to in­
dicate the "tone" of the study. No attempt is made to be 
definitive about the term itself.
Influences on Personality Theory
Hall and Lindzey point to four major sources of in­
fluence on personality t h e o r y . 25 Initially they cite the 
contribution of Freud, Jung, and others of the psychoanalytic 
or clinical approach. The contributions of these men did 
"more to determine the nature of personality theory than any
O O
Gordon W. Allport, Personality: A Psychological
Interpretation (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1937),
p. 26.
24ibid., p. 25.
25calvin S^Jiall and Gardner Lindzey, Theories of 
Personality (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1957),
pp. 1-27.
22
other single f a c t o r . "26 The influence of the psychoanalytic 
school is evidenced in most of the texts treating the concept 
of "dogmatism" in their reliance upon Freud's notions of 
dominance and dependence. It should be noted, however, that 
this dependence is not without some dilution. Rokeach, for 
example, often refers to the Freudian disciple as an example 
of a dogmatic or "closed-minded" individual, and Fromm de­
votes a large portion of his work to the differentiation be­
tween Freud's and his own theories. It appears that psycho­
analysis' main contribution to personality theory is in the 
recognition and identification of central behavior "patterns" 
through clinical observation. This "phenomenological" ap­
proach might be compared to Aristotle's observing and identi­
fying ethos, logos, and pathos and then, to a great extent, 
leaving to others the task of finding out how these factors 
actually function in practice. This does not mean that the 
theories of Freud and Aristotle were not functional. But the 
theories were both phenomenological and lacked the "scientific" 
objectivity now popular in both speech and psychology.
The second area of influence upon personality theory 
rises out of the Gestalt tradition exemplified by the works
2*Ibid.
23
of Koffka, Kohler, and others. The Impact of this school 
led to the rejection of segmented or analytical approaches 
to the study of personality.
The final two areas of influence are experimental 
psychology and psychometric methods, both of which have led 
researchers to check and objectify the existing theoretical 
concepts of personality, stiffen the requirements of empir­
ical research and shift the emphasis of research to individ­
ual differences.
The central pattern of current personality theory 
emerges from the four areas mentioned. Deriving much of his 
understanding from the concepts of psychoanalysis, the con­
temporary psychologist in the area of personality is attempt­
ing to investigate the individual as a whole organism with 
the most scientific, objective means at his disposal. In 
this effort, there have been many different paths of re­
search undertaken. One of the most interesting of these 
current studies is the investigation of "authoritarianism.”
The Study of Authoritarianism 
In the development of the theory of authoritarian­
ism, there are at least four important theoretical works.
The first is Maslow's "The Authoritarian Character
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Structure"second, Erich Fromm's Escape from Freedom; 
third, the extensive studies on the "Authoritarian Personal­
ity" by Adomo, ^  and last. The Open and Closed Mind
by Milton Rokeach. The purpose of this section is to discuss 
some major points of these works that are relevant to the 
present study.
The Authoritarian Character Structure. One of the 
most comprehensive descriptions of the personality factors 
involved in authoritarianism can be found in Maslow's "The 
Authoritarian Character Structure." Maslow describes some 
twenty characteristics of the authoritarian character which 
he observed in five years of clinical studies. Some of the 
more important of these are: (1) a world view which por­
trays human beings as selfish, stupid, or evil and the world 
as generally threatening; (2) a "tendency toward hierarchy," 
so seeing others as either superior or inferior to oneself; 
(3) the "generalization of superiority and inferiority,"
^^A. H. Maslow, "The Authoritarian Character Struc­
ture," Joura^l .of XVIII (1943), 401-411.
^^Erich Fromm, Escape from Freedom (New York:
Rinehart and Company, Inc., 1941).
^^T. W. Adomo, ^  , The Authoritarian Personal­
ity (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950).
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in other words, the superior is superior in all things and 
the inferior is inferior in everything; (4) the authoritarian 
individual is hostile and possesses prejudices about groups 
without much selectivity; (5) he possesses a single measure 
of values, such as wealth, power, etc.; (6) he identifies 
kindness with weakness; (7) he has a tendency to "use" 
people; and (8) he suffers considerably from guilt feelings 
and complexes. These characteristics are fairly typical of 
descriptions by other investigators as well.
It should be noted that the concept of authoritar­
ianism outlined by Maslow is primarily structural; that is, 
it describes a basic personality skeleton which may be filled 
out with a wide variety of specific substance or content.
For example, to designate a person as a political conserva­
tive or a socialist does not indicate in any way the degree 
of authoritarianism present in his personality structure.
If this concept is accurate, then just knowing specific 
attitudes may not indicate the presence of authoritarianism 
characteristics.
gscape from Freedom. Erich Fromm's thesis is that 
to explain the success of totalitarian governments solely by 
citing cunning and force, inexperience in democracy, economic 
determinism, or the madness of rulers is fallacious and
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dangerous. The reasons he cites for the enslavement of 
people lie, instead, in the individual's inability to deal 
with "freedom" successfully. Where Freud concerns himself 
with the image of the individual struggling with frustra­
tions of his "instinctual needs," Fromm raises the conflict 
between the individual and his cultural environment as the 
primary psychological problem.
Although there are certain needs, such as hunger, 
thirst, sex, which are common to man, those drives 
which make for the differences in men's characters, 
like love and hatred, the lust for power and the 
yearning for submission, the enjoyment of sensuous 
pleasure and the fear of it, are all products of 
the social p r o c e s s . 30
Central in Fromm's analysis is his description of 
"mechanisms of escape." The three mechanisms discussed are 
"authoritarianism," "destructiveness," and "automaton con­
formity." Only "authoritarianism" will be dealt with here 
since the latter two concepts are not of direct concern.
Authoritarianism is described as "the tendency to
give up the independence of one's own individual self and
to fuse one's self with somebody or something outside of
oneself in order to acquire the strength which the individ-
0-1
ual self is lacking." This particular mechanism manifests
^^Fromm, p . 12.
^^Ibid., p. 171.
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itself in the "striving for submission and domination" by 
the individual or his "masochistic" and "sadistic" tenden­
cies. This involves feelings of inferiority, powerlessness, 
and insignificance. This is the neurotic personality indulg­
ing in the self-torture of self-accusation, compulsive be­
havior, self-punishment, cruelty toward others, desire for 
power, and the desire to dominate and be dominated. In other 
words it reflects the individual's effort to get rid of "the 
burden of freedom" by piling it onto the shoulders of someone 
else, stronger and wiser than himself.
Fromm draws an essential distinction between two 
types of authority. One kind, "rational authority," is a 
state of superiority-inferiority in which both participants 
have a common goal of equalization or betterment for all 
concerned. The other type of authority is "inhibiting auth­
ority"; wherein the superior's goal is the exploitation of 
the subordinate. In the former case the gap of authority 
between participants narrows. In the latter, the gap widens. 
The teacher-student relationship is used as an example of 
the first type. The master-slave relationship is an example 
of the second. Admiration is the result of the first, irra­
tional adulation results from the second.
The authoritarian looks to the past for support.
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Fate has determined his life, and he is powerless to change 
his course. "What has been will eternally be."
In summary the individual described by Fromm, exter­
nally free but internally hostile and fearful, bears a close 
resemblance to the "authoritarian character" described ear­
lier by Maslow. Still another similarity between the two 
treatments is Fromm's attempt to explain the manifestations 
of authoritarianism where Maslow merely described what he 
could observe. It is interesting that the results of two 
apparently independent investigations should be so similar. 
These men furnished a firm theoretical basis upon which 
others, like Adomo and Rokeach, could profitably build 
through experimental documentation and elaboration.
The Authoritarian Personality. Undoubtedly the most 
extensive undertaking in the investigation of authoritarian­
ism is the California studies reported in The Authoritarian 
Personality. Beginning in 1944, under sponsorship of the 
American Jewish Committee, the scope of the studies ranges 
over a vast area of political, religious, social, and ideo­
logical conflict. This present discussion will concern it­
self only with The Authoritarian Personality because of its 
relevance to this particular investigation. It should be 
noted, however, that there are companion volumes which join
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The Authoritarian Personality under the general label 
"Studies in Prejudice."
As in the case of the previously cited studies by 
Maslow and Fromm, The Authoritarian Personality relies 
heavily upon the concepts developed by Freud for the basis 
of its theory of personality. Personality, driven by vari­
ous needs, is the "determinant" of ideological predisposi­
tion. However, the authors point out that personality can 
be understood only in the context supplied by its environment.
' ' Far from being something which is given in the begin­
ning, which remains fixed and acts upon the surround­
ing world, personality evolves under the impact of 
the social totality within which it occurs. . . .
This means that broad changes in social conditions and 
institutions will have a direct bearing upon the kinds 
of personalities that develop within a society.3%
Once again the personality is treated as an adaptive structure.
There is a close similarity between the Adorno re­
searchers and Fromm in the motivation behind their respective 
studies. Both express a curiosity about the reasons why 
people seem to flock to the banner of the authoritarian 
leader. Both have drawn upon Freud to establish their diag­
nostic theories. The major difference lies in the application 
of method. Fromm emphasized the interview method of the
32Adomo, pp. 5-6.
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psychoanalytic approach for his data while The Authoritarian 
Personality includes a wide variety of investigative proce­
dures in the exploration of "fascism." Both clinical and 
questionnaire techniques were used extensively. The studies 
have an overwhelming empirical "tone" as a result of the ex­
tensive statistical data accumulated.
Perhaps the most important of the conclusions 
reached.in The Authoritarian Personality is that "authoritar­
ianism" appears to operate as a generalized "syndrome" of 
attitudes and behavior. If an individual is prejudiced to­
ward one minority group, it is probable that he is hostile 
toward all minority groups. If he acts rigidly in one kind 
of situation, he is likely to react in rigid and stereotyped 
patterns in all situations.
Thus a basically hierarchical, authoritarian, ex­
ploitive parent-child relationship is apt to carry 
over into a power-oriented, exploitively dependent 
attitude toward one's sex partner and one ^s God and 
may well culminate in a political philosophy and 
social outlook which has no room for anything but a 
desperate clinging to what appears to be a strong 
and disdainful rejection of whatever is relegated 
to the bottom.33
One very important challenge to the findings of The 
Authoritarian Personality has been leveled at the "F" scale's
^^Ibid., p. 971.
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emphasis upon "right authoritarianism." Edward Shils, in 
his discussion of "Authoritarianism: 'Right' and 'Left',"
points to the error of assuming that authoritarianism is 
characteristic of only conservative or fascistic ideological 
movements.
Fascism and Bolshevism, only a few decades ago thought 
of as worlds apart, have now been recognized as shar­
ing many very important features. Their common hos­
tility towards civil liberties, political democracy, 
their common antipathy for parliamentary institutions, 
individualism, private enterprise, their image of the 
political world as a struggle between morally irrecon­
cilable forces, their belief that all their opponents 
are secretly leagued against them and their own pre­
dilection for secrecy, their conviction that all forms 
of power are, in a hostile world, concentrated and 
total power— all of these showed that the two extremes
had much in c o m m o n . 34
The Open and Closed Mind. The distinction to be 
drawn between The Authoritarian Personality and The Open and 
Closed Mind lies in the former's approach to the "authori­
tarian" personality as basic to the understanding of fas­
cism and the letter's emphasis upon "dogmatism" or "general 
authoritarianism" as characteristic of all manifestations of 
belief or opinion. In spite of the differences between 
Rokeach's approach and that of the California researchers,
34Edward A. Shils, "Authoritarianism: 'Right' and
' L e f t ' I n  Studies in the Scope and Method of the Authori­
tarian Personality, Richard Christie and Marie Jahoda, eds. 
(Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1954), pp. 27-28.
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the direction of The Open and Closed Mind parallels in many
ways the theory outlined in the previous studies and carries
the inquiry beyond the limitations imposed by confining the
study to prejudice.
Long before we were able to define the phenomenon of 
ideological dogmatism explicitly, it seemed clear 
that it referred to a number of things: a closed way
of thinking which could be associated with any 
ideology regardless of content, an authoritarian out­
look on life, an intolerance toward those of opposing 
beliefs, and a sufferance of those with similar 
beliefs. To say that a person is dogmatic or that 
his belief system is closed is to say something about 
the way he believes and the way he thinks— not only 
about single issues but also about networks of 
issues. The closed mind, even though most people can­
not define it precisely, can be observed in the 
"practical” world of political and religious beliefs, 
and the more academic world of scientific, philo­
sophic, and humanistic thought. In both of these 
worlds there is conflict among men about who is right 
and who wrong, who is rational and who rationalizing, 
and conflicts over whose convictions are dogmatic 
and whose intellectual. In both sets of worlds, 
ideas— and the people and authority figures respon­
sible for them--are accepted and r e j e c t e d . 35
The concept of systematic structure, not unique in 
this kind of approach, is applied more vigorously in The 
Open and Closed Mind than in any of its companion studies. 
Important in the understanding of the structure of beliefs 
is the development of the "belief and disbelief systems."
35Rokeach, p. 5.
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These are described as:
. ... all the beliefs, sets, expectations, or hypoth­
eses, conscious, that a person at a given time accepts 
as true of the world he lives in. The disbelief sys­
tem is composed of a series of subsystems rather than 
merely a single one, and contains all the disbeliefs, 
sets, expectancies, conscious or unconscious, that, 
to one degree or another, a person at a given time 
rejects as f a l s e . 36
The "belief-disbelief" system has a three-dimensional 
structure. The first of these divisions is the "belief- 
disbelief dimension"; the second, the "central-peripheral 
dimension"; and the third, the "time-perspective dimension."
The first of these, the "belief-disbelief dimension," 
involves the isolation of beliefs, the relative amount of 
differentiation between beliefs and the "detail" of those 
beliefs, and the comprehensiveness of the system.
One manifestation of isolation is the existence of 
conflicts between beliefs as in the case of "authoritarian­
ism" and "democracy" above. Another indication of isolation 
is the accentuation of differences between Protestantism and 
Catholicism, the United States and Russia, or perhaps speech 
and psychology, showing a defensive attitude toward ideas 
that may serve to prevent additional incoming information 
from making any perceptible impact upon existing- beliefs.
SGlbid., p. 33.
34
The beliefs are isolated because they are insulated from 
reality. Two other factors contributing to the phenomenon 
of belief isolation are the perception of irrelevance [when 
the information perceived is relevant but threatening] and 
the denial of contradiction.
"Differentiation" refers to the ". . . degrees of 
differentiation or articulation or richness of detail"^? in 
the belief-disbelief system. Signs of differentiation can 
be discovered in an analysis of the amount of knowledge the 
individual possesses about his beliefs and about the things 
he rejects as untrue. The "closed-minded" person knows 
little about the concepts he accepts and less about those 
with which he disagrees. The "closed mind" tends to "lump" 
all of the concepts he accepts or rejects under one roof.
The "central-peripheral dimension" includes three 
basic regions: the "central," the "intermediate," and the
"peripheral." The first of these, the "central" region, 
concerns itself with the "primitive" beliefs of the individ­
ual. Examples of this phenomenon might include the way in 
which you view the world around you, the environment being 
harsh and cruel or permissive and encouraging. Corresponding
37lbid., p. 37.
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concepts are Maslow's description of the authoritarian world 
view as threatening, evil, and selfish, and Adorno's cate­
gories of "projection" and "destructiveness and cynicism."
It includes the self-picture— tall, short, intelligent, or 
dull--and the way the person relates to other human beings.
. . . One definition of a primitive belief is any 
belief that virtually everyone is believed to have 
also. For example, I believe this object I write 
with is a pencil and I believe that all persons in 
a position to know (this excludes infants, strangers, 
etc.) would agree with me on both counts [sic]. All 
such-persons could be said to be external referents 
or authorities for these beliefs. When this is the 
case, my belief is primitive. It is rarely, if ever, 
challenged.
It is also true that the opposite of the universal 
belief is a primitive one. There is no dependence upon out­
side authority or source for validation. An unexplained 
fear of heights, dogs, and the Ph. D. qualifying examination 
all fall within this category.
The "intermediate" region contains those beliefs in 
the authorities accepted by the individual. The Bible, 
Aristotle's Rhetoric, and The Coming of the New Deal, a 
seemingly inconsistent trio, may, nevertheless, be examples 
of the sources of the knowledge we have chosen to include 
within the scope of our belief systems. The extent to which
38Ibid., p. 41.
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we accept a particular authority will depend upon our con­
cept of who is an adequate authority. We often hear the 
phrase, "I want to know what my enemy is thinking." This 
indication of "open-mindedness" may indicate that, if we are 
a political conservative, we read the New Republic; or, if 
we are more liberal minded, we may scan Human Events or read 
The Conscience of a Conservative in order that we may eval­
uate accurately information coming from more agreeable and 
trusted sources. The "closed-minded" person, of course, 
will tend to ignore these sources which disagree with his 
notions of what is right and wrong. A similar pattern is 
found in the irrational adulation of authority cited by 
Fromm. Some of the manifestations of this kind of reliance 
upon authority can be observed readily in our contemporary 
society. The ethnocentric "ingroup-outgroup" statements of 
some of the political and social extremists illustrate this. 
You are either "for or against" socialism, Americanism, 
democracy, communism, peace, or war. Our communication pat­
terns abound with "opinionated rejection," such as: "People
are 'stupid' if they believe that Kennedy's foreign policy 
will differ from Eisenhower's, or that we can negotiate with 
Communists, or that we can win friends with foreign aid."
The reverse of this condition, "opinionate acceptance," also
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has its place when we approve of people because the ideas 
they hold are the same as our own. In other words, the sur­
render of our own critical faculties to accepted symbols of 
authority encourages the acceptance and rejection of people 
on the basis of how apparently similar or dissimilar their 
beliefs are to our own.
There are, therefore, "primitive" beliefs about the 
world, the self, and others; "intermediate" beliefs concerned 
with the acceptance or rejection of authority and the people 
whom we identify with that authority; and finally, the "pe­
ripheral" beliefs, which are derived from the previous two 
dimensions. For example, a primitive belief may be that we 
live in a friendly and permissive world. People, we have ob­
served, usually help each other. The philosophy of political 
liberalism may, in our judgment, offer the "humanistic" 
approach we desire for the solution of the world’s problems. 
We favor, therefore, 90 per cent of parity on farm supports 
because it is the policy of the party we support and from 
whom we receive valid [we believe] information. This spe­
cific adherence to farm supports is a "peripheral" belief. 
This inqplies that what we receive has already undergone a 
screening process. Our primitive beliefs reduced the number 
of authorities we could choose. Our authorities supplied
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only that information they thought relevant. We absorbed 
only what was in agreement with previously formed beliefs.
The things we observe in the world around us will be inter­
preted because of the beliefs we hold. Change is difficult 
because it is easier to reconcile information with existing 
beliefs than it is to allow it to travel untouched, to more 
fundamental areas where risks of conflict are involved.. Note 
the similarity between this notion of selectivity and 
Festinger's theory of "cognitive dissonance," where the in­
dividual is motivated to reduce the dissonance or tension 
between conflicting beliefs.39
The "time-perspective" dimension, is the final struc­
tural conç)onent of the belief system. This refers to the 
person's beliefs about the past, present, and future and the 
manner in which they are related to each other. An individual 
may possess either a narrow or broad time perspective. A 
broad perspective, characteristic of "open-mindedness," in­
dicates that the person recognizes and utilizes the lessons of 
history, the demands of the present, and the future conse­
quences of his behavior. A narrow perspective results from 
an overemphasis of one of these three areas. Rejecting the
39ieon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance 
(Evanston, Illinois: Row, Peterson and Company, 1957).
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traditions of the past or the realities of the present for 
promises that the future offers is characteristic of 
"narrowness
. . . The old man who spends much of his time 
reminiscing about the days gone by is one case in 
point. A similar exanç>le is found in the ideological 
movements of the political right, which typically 
seek their models in the past. We are thinking here 
of German naziism and of Japanese and Italian fascism 
whose goals are to reinstate the Aryan myth, or the 
medieval structure of Japanese society, or the 
grandeur that was Rome.
In line with Fromm's thesis of "freedom" and its 
resultant pressures, the over-emphasis of one time period 
provides an effective avenue of "escape."
The three major dimensions of the belief system do 
not operate independently. The end product of their rela­
tionship will be the "closed" or "open-minded' manifestations 
of human behavior.
This leads us to suggest a basic characteristic 
that defines the extent to which a person's system 
is open or closed; namely, the extent to which the 
person can receive, evaluate, and act on relevant 
information received from the outside on its own 
merits, unencumbered by irrelevant factors in the 
situation arising from within the person or from 
the outside.41
The irrelevant internal pressures might include any
^^Rokeach, p. 52.
41lbid., p. 57.
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number of personality variables such as the need for power, 
unrelated habits, sets, cues, etc. External factors might 
take the form of social and cultural norms, pressure from 
family, peer groups, and financial pressures of various 
kinds. The more "open" the system the easier will the per­
son be able to withstand these pressures and objectively 
evaluate what he receives. A "closed" system will have dif­
ficulty in distinguishing between objective and subjective 
reality. Critical senses will be dulled, and the ability to 
take the initiative will be circumscribed to the areas pre­
scribed by the sources of information.
The characteristics of "dogmatism" outlined in the 
"Dogmatism Scale" parallel, in many respects, the factors in­
volved in the preceding studies of authoritarianism. Some of 
the important characteristics examined by the scale are: (1)
"the accentuation of differences between the belief and dis­
belief systems"; (2) the "coexistence of the contradictions 
within the belief system"; (3) the "relative amount of knowl­
edge possessed"; (4) the "beliefs regarding the aloneness, 
isolation, and helplessness of man"; (5) "beliefs regarding 
the uncertainty of the future"; (6) "beliefs about self­
adequacy and inadequacy"; (7) "self-aggrandizement as a de­
fense against self-inadequacy"; (8) "authoritarianism"; (9)
41
"intolerance"; (10) "tendency to make a party-line change!'; 
(11) the selective avoidance of information counter to one's 
beliefs; (12) an overemphasis of the past, present or future; 
and (13) the "belief in force as a way to revise the 
present
By way of summarizing these approaches to the analy­
sis of the authoritarian or closed-minded personality, there 
appear to be a number of recurrent themes. It might be of 
value, at this point, to integrate the various character­
istics of closed-mindedness into a portrait of the extreme 
authoritarian individual.
At the inner, core of the personality there is an in­
grained, generalized hostility directed at the self and at 
the world at large. The individual suffers from guilt and 
anxiety, and this results in the manifestations of self- 
humiliation, masochism, and feelings of seIf-inadequacy. 
Toward others, the authoritarian is sadistic, domineering, 
and cynical. He believes himself to be alone, isolated from 
the society of which he is a part. In short, he is con­
fronted in his every movement or thought by an overwhelming 
and hostile system, of his own creation, over which he has
42ibid.. pp. 73-80.
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no control whatsoever.
In his search for control and identity, he selects 
strength and power as his criteria of success and endeavors 
to surrender himself totally to symbols which represent 
these qualities. Status is strength and strength becomes 
status. If he, by chance, obtains a position of superiority 
over others, he asserts his role with sadistic and humiliat­
ing treatment of those he considers to be his inferiors. 
Because his world is conçosed of good and bad, leaders and 
followers, the superior and the inferior, he identifies 
totally with a cause or group and is hostile or prejudiced 
toward all others who do not choose to ally themselves with 
him or his chosen authorities.
The authoritarian individual is "compulsively con­
ventional" in his behavior. He assumes his role and the be­
havior patterns of that role become the accepted and incon­
trovertible way of doing things. Those who demonstrate 
unconventional behavior, attitudes, or beliefs become, for 
the authoritarian, objects of derision.
He is "time-bound," clinging to the belief that "times 
were better," or "times will be better," or "now is the time."
The individual is afraid, and his fear leads him to 
perceive the world as something other than it really is. On
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guard for information that will expose his feelings, he dis­
torts and censors all that he receives. He knows only the 
good of his own cause and only the evil of others.
The authoritarian personality is a total system with 
beliefs and disbeliefs as its variables, each part interact­
ing and influencing each other part to varying degrees. The 
environment, as the object of perception, plays its part in
the formulation of beliefs but is not necessarily responsible
for the ultimate content of the belief system.
Authoritarianism is an integrated, yet malfunction­
ing, whole. It is not merely a single attitude, a point of
view, or act to be examined. It is the person with whom we
must deal.
Summary
From the review of ethos, it becomes obvious that 
the concept of ethos has, for centuries, been accepted as 
being an integral part of the persuasive situation. Experi­
mental studies reinforce ancient theory by indicating that 
two main components in establishing ethos are the perceived 
trustworthiness and expertness of the speaker. A review of 
experimental studies on ethos further indicates that a 
speaker who is perceived by the listeners as being both
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trustworthy and an expert should be able to cause a greater 
attitude shift than a speaker perceived as being neither 
trustworthy nor expert. A review of personality theory in­
dicates that the concept of belief systems is a valuable 
tool in organizing and explaining human behavior, especially 
in a person's resistance to change, including the persuasive 
situation. If these two conclusions are valid, then produc­
tive research might be acconçlished by studying these factors 
in their various combinations. This investigation attempts 
such a study by generating the following hypotheses.
Basic Hypotheses
I. It was hypothesized that a speech with certain open- 
minded characteristics would be more effective in chang­
ing attitudes than a speech with certain closed-minded 
characteristics. Symbolically: 0> C.
II. It was hypothesized that the relative effectiveness of 
a communication will vary with the recipient's percep­
tion of the communicator's credibility. Symbolically:
^0^ ^ L*
III. It was hypothesized that a person's dogmatism would
significantly affect his response in a persuasive situ­
ation. Symbolically : Dg> % >  Di,.
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IV. Based on the hypotheses listed above, certain interac­
tion hypotheses were formulated:
A. The source's credibility, as reflected in an intro­
duction, will affect the relatively dogmatic re­
cipient more than the open-minded recipient. Sym­
bolically : (H-L) d> (H-L)n> (H-L) ^ .
B. The recipients with relatively high dogmatism scores 
will show a greater difference in change of attitude 
between an open-minded and a closed-minded speech 
than will more open-minded recipients. Symbolically ; 
(A]_-A2)d> (Al-A2)n> (A1-A2) o -
CHAPTER III
THE EXPERIMENT
Ethos has held a place in rhetoric from the earliest 
to the most recent theories while "dogmatism" is a more re­
cent but highly inclusive concept for explaining behavior in 
persuasive situations. This study sought to investigate cer­
tain combinations of these two concepts in order to leam 
more of their respective in^ortance and relation to each 
other. In searching previous literature, no study could be 
found which clearly involved both these concepts so there 
was no specific precedent to follow in designing the experi­
ment. The purpose of this chapter is to specify the think­
ing and experimental conditions which governed this study.
It includes the basic design of the experiment, the attitude 
measurement techniques employed, including rationale for the 
three different scales used in the study, the construction 
of the test materials (speeches and introductions), the 
actual administration of the experiment, and ends with a
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discussion of some of the limitations and possible sources 
of error in this study.
Basic Design
Since one of the primary considerations of this 
study was to examine the experimental data concerning ethos 
and dogmatism in all their possible combinations, a three 
dimensional design was chosen as most suitable for the ex­
periment. The first factor was open and closed-minded 
speeches; one relatively open-minded and one relatively 
closed-minded speech. The second factor was perceived image 
or ethos of the two speakers; one with high ethos and the 
other with relatively low ethos. In order to increase the 
precision of the experiment, three levels of audience dogma­
tism were established by the use of each subject's Haiman 
Dogmatism test score.
The design is shown graphically on the following 
page. In this diagram, speech (A), introduction (B), and 
audience dogmatism (C), are the independent factors. This 
design provides for the simultaneous investigation of the 
effects of the two speeches (A), the two different intro­
ductions plus a condition with no introduction at all (B), 
and three levels of dogmatism (C). Furthermore, the design
TABLE I. DIAGRAM FOR TWO FACTOR BY LEVELS DESIGN
Bi B, B, B r Br
C l  C 2  C 3  C l  C 2  C 3  C l  C 2  C 3  C l  C 2  C 3  C l  C 2  C 3  C l  C 2  C 3
A - Speech
Ai - Open-minded Speech 
A2 - Close-minded Speech 
B - Introduction
C - Levels of Dogmatism of Audience 
C^ - Relatively Dogmatic 
C2 - Neither Dogmatic nor Open-minded 
C3 - Relatively Open-minded (non-dogmatic)
00
Bi - High Credibility Introduction AB - Interaction of A and B
B2 - Low Credibility Introduction 
B3 - No Introduction
AC - Interaction of A and C 
BC - Interaction of B and C
I
\
ABC - Interaction of A, B, and C
49
takes into account all possible interaction effects of the 
three independent factors, i.e., AB, AC, BC, and ABC.
Speeches
One of the experimental factors used in this experi­
ment was the type of speech heard by the audience. To meet 
the requirements of the experimental design, two speeches _ 
were constructed: (1) a relatively "open-minded” speech and
(2) a relatively "close-minded" speech. The subject of the 
speeches was the issue of the desirability of parity price 
supports for agricultural products. This problem was se­
lected as one of national importance on which a variety of 
opinions existed but one unlikely to be resolved during the 
experiment and one which was not receiving major attention 
in the news media.
After investigating the problem of parity price sup­
ports, it was decided to present a persuasive speech advo­
cating that parity price supports for agricultural products 
should be abandoned. This thesis was not receiving wide at­
tention by the Kennedy Administration or in Congress.
The problem-solution pattern of organization was em­
ployed. However, the problem phase accounted for about 
eighty per cent of the material. The suggested solution was
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not presented in specific detail. Presentation of an alter­
native solution to the farm problem was viewed as a rhetori­
cal technique to increase opposition to the concept of parity 
price supports. The single purpose of the speeches was to 
increase opposition to parity price support programs ; the 
measure of persuasion is solely determined by the attitude 
change toward that concept.
The most important factor in the construction of the 
speeches was the introduction of open- and closed-mindedness. 
There are many factors which act as determinants of open- 
mindedness or closed-mindedness. Of course, all of the at­
tributes of open- and closed-mindedness cannot be encompassed 
in two speeches on the same subject. Rather than seek a 
difference through an exhaustive variety of techniques, the 
following criteria acted as guidelines in the construction 
of the experimental stimuli. These criteria are those which, 
according to Rokeach, typify the open and closed minded per­
sonalities.1 Closed-mindedness was considered to be estab­
lished when a speaker;
(1) reveals an ingrained, generalized hostility directed 
at the self and at the world at large;
(2) is domineering and cynical towards others ;
^Rokeach, pp. 54-72.
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(3) believes himself alone, isolated from the companion-
- ship others might furnish;
(4) surrenders himself to symbols which represent quali­
ties of success;
(5) acts as if the world were composed of good and bad,
■ leaders and followers, the superior and inferior;
(6) identifies totally with a cause or group and is 
hostile or prejudiced toward others who do not 
choose to ally themselves with him or his chosen 
authorities ;
(7) is compulsively conventional in his behavior;
(8) assumes his role and the behavior patterns of that 
role become the accepted and incontrovertible way
• of doing things;
(9) those who exhibit unconventional behavior, atti­
tudes, or beliefs become objects of derision;
(10) is "time-bound," clinging to the belief that "times
■ wGre better," or "times will be better" or "now is 
the time";
(11) has fears which lead him to perceive the world as 
something other than it really is; and/or
(12) distorts and censors all that he receives knowing
- only the good of his own cause and only the evil of 
others.
Open-mindedness was considered to be established when a 
speaker exhibits few of the criteria listed above and when 
he:
(1) reveals broad knowledge and understanding of many 
aspects of the problems as well as its relation to 
other problems ;
(2) supports his views by well-qualified authorities
- whose expertness is established by the speaker when 
necessary;
(3) shows accuracy, care, precision, in his use of evi-
- dence, particularly citations of authority and 
statistics, and in his reasoning;
(4) reveals or is known to have personal, practical ex-
- perience with the problem;
(5) is known to possess widely accepted "expertness" on
- the subject;
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(6) is known to hold a position which validates his 
- authority; and/or
(7) is known to have studied the problem intensively.
The speech employing techniques designed to establish 
attributes of open-mindedness was completed first. This 
speech included extensive direct quotation from a variety of 
authorities, statistics presented in exact detail, and mate­
rial covering a number of years. Reference to personal 
knowledge and experience with farming and the farm problem 
was also included.
The manuscript for the open-minded speech was em­
ployed in creating the closed-minded speech. All references 
to sources were deleted. Statistics were changed from pre­
cise figures to relatively vague ones. Specific indications 
of lack of familiarity with farming and the farm problem re­
placed indication of personal practical experience.
Much of the material, including statements of the 
thesis, summaries, and transitions, remained unchanged. 
Arrangements, arguments, and amount of repetition were kept 
constant.
The two speeches were practiced equally and recorded 
by a graduate student in theatre. The speeches were re­
corded on hi-fidelity tape at a constant volume level under 
identical conditions. The speaker maintained approximately
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the same rate for both speeches and was asked to deliver 
both in the same manner. Since both speeches were recorded 
by the same speaker, it was impossible to conceal the dif­
ferences in the speeches from him. Perception of these 
differences may alter the effectiveness of one of the pre­
sentations . However, the impact of such differences has not 
been demonstrated experimentally. Hildreth, for example, 
found that judgments of sincerity of the speaker made by 
audiences seem dominated by coupetence of the speaker, not 
sincerity.2 A manuscript copy of the speeches is reproduced 
in Appendix B.
Manuscript copies of the two speeches were submitted 
to a group of seven faculty members. This panel was unani­
mously successful in identifying the open and closed minded 
speeches. After the speeches were taped, they were played 
to a group of twelve graduate students. This panel also 
agreed unanimously that there was a difference in the 
speeches and correctly identified both speeches.
2
Richard A. Hildreth. "An Experimental Study of 
Audience's Ability to Distinguish Between Sincere and In­
sincere Speakers." Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation (Univer­
sity of Southern California, 1953).
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Introductions
Two introductions were written and recorded by a 
person who is an experienced radio announcer unknown to the 
audience. The two introductions attempted to establish one 
speaker as being both trustworthy and expert on farm price 
supports while the second left the impression that the 
speaker was neither trustworthy nor an expert. The intro­
ductions were intended to suggest clear differences in the 
prestige and credibility of the speaker.
Ethos îfeasurement
Measurement of trustworthiness. The semantic dif­
ferential technique was used to measure perceived trust­
worthiness established by the introductions. In evaluative 
studies of the semantic differential technique, high 
reliability and validity were achieved in comparison with 
Thurstone scales, Guttman scales, and other measuring 
techniques.^
Most semantic differential scales are simple in 
appearance, consisting usually of a set of ten to a dozen
^Charles E. Osgood, George J. Suci, and Percy H. 
Tannenbaum, The Measurement of Meaning (Urbana: University
of Illinois Press, 1957), pp. 194-195.
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7-step, bipolar scales designed to tap certain dimensions 
of meaning. Several scoring procedures are possible. The 
one adopted for this study assigns the positive numbers, 1 ,
2, 3, 4, 5, 6 , 7, to consecutive scale positions. In all 
cases the negative (bad, untrustworthy, dishonest, etc.) 
adjective was assigned to the "1" end of the scale. The 
score for an individual subject was obtained by summing his 
score on each of the scales.
The actual scales used in this experiment were those 
found to be efficient measures of trustworthiness of a 
speaker in a factor analysis study done by Kenneth Anderson.^ 
This scale is reproduced in Appendix C.
Measurement of expertness. A second measuring in­
strument was used to evaluate the expertness of the speakers 
introduced. This instrument was also designed by Kenneth 
Anderson in his study of the various aspects of artistic and 
non-artistic ethos. This second instrument is a Likert type 
scale.. Reliability of this instrument computed by the split 
half method was .93 and .98 in two studies. Corrected for 
attenuation the coefficient of reliability was .96 and .99.
^Kenneth E. Anderson, "An Experimental Study of the 
Interaction of Artistic Ethos in Persuasion," Unpublished 
Ph. D. dissertation (University of Wisconsin, 1961), p. 82.
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This scale is reproduced in Appendix C.
Pilot Study on Introductions
A pilot study was used to determine the perceived 
trustworthiness and expertness of the two introductions.
The recorded introductions were played to students in dif­
ferent classes (P. A. 101, Oral Communication) who were then 
asked to reveal their opinion of the man introduced as to 
his trustworthiness and expertness on the subject of Farm 
Price Supports. An eleven item semantic differential scale 
was used to measure the trustworthiness of the man introduced 
and a twenty-two question Likert type scale was used to 
measure the expertness of the man introduced. These scales 
are reproduced in Appendix C.
The criterion for the selection of the introductions 
to be used in the final study was the consistency and loca­
tion of the trustworthiness and expertness of the person 
being introduced as perceived by the subjects. The results 
of this test are contained in Table I A.
As a result of these data the introductions for both 
speakers were rewritten and given to another group of 46 
subjects. The results of this test are contained in Table 
I B. From the results of these two pilot studies one
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introduction was chosen in which the speaker was felt (by 
the subjects) to be both "expert" and "trustworthy" on the 
subject of Farm Price Supports, and a second introduction 
was chosen in which the speaker was represented to be neither 
an "expert" nor "trustworthy" on this topic.
TABLE I A. PERCEIVED CREDIBILITY OF VARIOUS SPEAKERS
Speaker
N = 61
"Trustworthiness" 
E X
"Expertness" 
E X
I High Credibility 3767 61.75 7651 125.43
II Low Credibility 2971 48.71 1781 29.53
TABLE I B. PERCEIVED CREDIBILITY OF VARIOUS SPEAKERS
Speaker
N = 46
"Trustworthiness" 
E X
"Expertness" 
E X
I High Credibility 2923 63.54 5892 128.09
II Low Credibility 1436 31.21 1244 27.26
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Subjects
The sample used in this experiment consisted of P. A. 
101 (Oral Communication) and Psychology 201 (Principles of 
Psychology) classes at the University of Southern Mississippi 
during the winter and spring quarters of 1963. No student 
participated in more than one phase of this study. A total 
of 210 students took part in the experiment. Each student 
completed a questionnaire supplying information such as sex, 
age, classification, grade average, home town, etc.
The mean age of each group of subjects ranged from 
18.6 to 23.3 with an overall mean of 20.2. The mean number 
of years of college of each group ranged from 1.1 to 2.3 
with an overall mean of 1.7. The grade point average of the 
18 groups ranged from 2.1 to 2.9 with an overall mean of 2.4 
where 2 indicates a C, 3 indicates a B, etc. Eighty-five 
(85) percent of those taking the tests were from the state 
of Mississippi. Additional information gained from a general 
information questionnaire filled out by the subjects is re­
produced by groups in Appendix A. These additional data are 
included to better define the population from which the sample 
is drawn.
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Dogmatism Measurement
Haiman scale. A version of the Haiman dogmatism 
scale furnished the necessary data for establishing levels 
of audience dogmatism in this study. The Haiman scale is 
derived from Rokeach's theory and utilizes Rokeach's re­
search to develop its scales. Haiman's primary contribution 
to the Rokeach scale is the check upon response set. The 
main reason, then, for not using the Rokeach scale is its 
lack of any internal check upon "response set" or "acquies­
cence." As in the Adomo s c a l e s , ^ all the questions in 
Rokeach's dogmatism scales are worded in the same direction 
so that the "high-dogmatic" respondent will tend to agree 
with the items and the "low-dogmatic" respondent will tend 
to disagree. Although the causes of response have not been 
universally agreed upon, recent studies indicate that there 
appears to be a tendency, on the part of some individuals, 
to respond to questions consistently in agreement or dis­
agreement regardless of the content of the questions. If 
this is the case, the results obtained do not reflect the 
attitude of the respondent toward the construct under in­
vestigation but merely a tendency to agree or disagree with
^Adomo, ^  al.
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all of the items.^
Rokeach advances three arguments that led him to re­
ject the possibility of response set in the dogmatism scale. 
First, there are systematic differences between the dogmatism, 
opinionation, F, and E scales; and all of these are worded in 
a single direction. It is not likely, therefore, that these 
differences would exist if response set were present to any 
great extent. Second, a high incidence of response set can­
not account for differences between the dogmatism and rigid­
ity scales. Third, response set could not play a major part 
in the "rich variety of differences" between the scores on 
the dogmatism scales.?
Couch and Kenniston developed a scale to measure 
"over-all agreement," or response set, and applied it to the 
dogmatism scale among other questionnaires. The scores ob­
tained on the three divisions of the dogmatism scale and the 
scores of the total scale correlated significantly with the
^See, for example, L. J. Cronbach, "Response Sets 
and Tests Validity," Educational Psychological Ifeasurement,
X (1950), 3-31; R. Christie and J. Havel, "Is the F Scale 
Irreversible?" Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology,
LVI (1958), 143-159; and L. J. Chapman and D. D. Campbell, 
"Response Set in the F Scale," Journal of Abnormal and 
Social Psychology, LIV No. 1 (1957), 129-132.
^Rokeach, pp. 406-407.
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Overall Agreement Scale among other similar questionnaires. 
The thesis of Couch's and Kenniston's study is that the ten­
dency to agree with items on a questionnaire reflects a 
basic personality syndrome.^  Their theory is supported to a 
degree by Gage and Chatterjee who contend that the answer to 
a scale could be interpreted in two ways— "logically" and 
"psychologically. In other words, the tendency to agree 
when in doubt may reflect, or be the result of, an "uncriti­
cal submissive attitude" characteristic of the authoritarian 
personality. Therefore, agreement to a vague and ambiguous 
positive [non-authoritarian] item might reflect submission 
rather than non-authoritarianism. The conclusion of these 
authors is that negative items should have greater validity 
in measuring authoritarianism than positive items. Their 
evidence was, however, inconclusive. Nevertheless, if there 
is a personality "syndrome" which leads a respondent (as the 
evidence appears to indicate) to answer according to direc­
tion rather than content, it is important that some check be
Q
C. Couch and K. Kenniston, "Yeasayers and Naysayers: 
Agreeing Response Set as a Personality Variable," Journal of 
Abnormal and Social Psychology LX, No. 2 (1960), 151-174.
^N. L. Gage and B. B. Chatterjee, "The Psychological 
Meaning of Acquiescence Set: Further Evidence," Journal of
Abnormal and Social Psychology, LX, No. 2 (1960), 280-283.
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provided to reveal this phenomenon. It is for this reason 
that Haiman reversed certain statements in the dogmatism 
scale.
Specifically, the Haiman scale consists of 30 items. 
Items 1, 2, 6 , 7, 10, 12, 13, 14, 19, 20, 22, 23, 25, 26, 
and 27 are phrased to receive a positive response from closed- 
minded subjects and a negative response from open-minded sub­
jects. The other 15 items are the reverse of this. Ten of 
the scale items (5 positives and 5 reversals) were written 
by Haiman and have survived item analyses on three previous 
drafts of the instrument. Five of the items are borrowed 
from the Rokeach Dogmatism scale, and five are reversals of 
Rokeach items written by Donald Duns. All ten of these items 
survived item analysis done as part of Duns' doctoral disser­
tation. Five of the items are borrowed from the California 
F scale, and five are reversals of F scale items written by 
Haiman. All ten of these items proved valid on item analyses 
done with this instrument. The reliability of this instru­
ment as measured by the test-retest method was established 
by Haiman at r = .75.
Attitude tfeasurement 
Since attitude toward the concept is the dependent
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variable, attitude measurement becomes an important con­
sideration in this study. Scientific attitude measurement 
began in the decade that followed World War I. But as in 
all new areas where tools must be created, precise methods 
and approaches evolved slowly. Today there are specific 
definitions which delimit the scope of attitude measurement.
Attitude measurement consists in assessing an 
individual's responses to a set of social objects or 
situations. This is done by observing a sample of 
behavior from an attitude universe. Each behavioral 
element in the attitude universe is the response to 
a particular situation or object.10
Such a definition begs the question of how the in­
vestigator taps the "response," a question which has resulted 
in a variety of measuring methods and devices. Certainly in 
this area, the experimenter is particularly dependent upon 
valid and dependable measurements. The measuring instruments 
used in this experiment were: a Likert type scale for meas­
uring a speaker's authoritativeness or expertness, and a 
Likert type scale for measuring attitude toward the concept 
of parity price supports.
Attitude Change Measurement
The attitude change measuring instrument was a Likert
F. Green, "Attitude Measurement," Handbook of 
Social Psychology, ed. G. Lindzey (Cambridge: Addison-
Wesley Publishing Co., 1954), 2 Vols-., I, p. 338.
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type scale of attitude toward parity price supports. This 
scale was also constructed by Anderson. The reliability of 
the instrument was .95 and .98. This scale is reproduced in 
Appendix C.
Attitude change, in this experiment, is operation­
ally defined as the difference in the subject's scores com­
puted the first day of the quarter and the score obtained 
immediately after hearing the speech.
Administration of the Experiment
During the first class meeting of the spring quarter, 
all subjects in the final experiment received a packet con­
taining the initial form of the attitude scale on parity 
price supports, the Haiman scale, a brief personal informa­
tion form, and instructions for completing the various forms. 
A sample of this packet is included in Appendix C. Care was 
taken not to suggest that the project was associated in any 
direct way with research in speech.
After tabulating the scores on the Haiman scale and 
the attitude toward parity price supports, all subjects were 
grouped into cells according to their dogmatism score. This 
was done so that all cells in the three dimensional design 
might be proportional. This, of course, simplified the
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statistical operations performed later. After proportion­
ality was established the individual members of the several 
classes were instructed to report to the assigned rooms at 
specific times as part of their regular class work in the 
course. Graduate students in public address were assigned 
randomly to assist in presenting the various experimental 
stimuli. The experimental procedure was discussed with the 
assistant and the measuring instrument carefully explained. 
Each assistant was provided with a standard set of instruc­
tions to be read to the subjects. On the day of the experi­
ment each assistant was supplied with a tape recorder, the 
appropriate tape, and the test booklets for his group.
The experimental groups met with the assistant at 
the designed room. A brief statement designed to secure co­
operation of the subjects was read. The tapes were then 
played. After the tapes were heard, the test booklets were 
distributed, and the marking of the Likert type scale ex­
plained. Following the conqjletion of the responses by the 
subjects, the materials were collected and the subjects 
thanked for their cooperation.
Statistical Procedure 
The three dimensional design (A x B x L) was chosen
66
for this study because this design provides the means where­
by two experimental variables and various levels of subjects 
may be studied simultaneously for the analysis of the total 
interaction and interaction between the various experimental 
variables at the different levels. The source for most of 
the statistical information is E. F. Linguist, Design and 
Analysis of Experiments in Psychology and Education.
Possible Sources of Error
Despite the efforts of the experimenter to use an 
experimental design and statistical methods which would ade­
quately control or randomize all variables not under con­
sideration, some sources of error are likely to appear in a 
study of this type. Some of these sources of error will be 
described in order to evaluate properly the conclusions 
which will be drawn.
1. College students are atypical members of the 
total population of the United States; conclusions, there­
fore, do not necessarily apply universally.
2. Another source of error might exist because 
some of the subjects realized that they were in an experi­
mental situation and this may have altered their normal 
reactions r
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3. The classroom provides somewhat artificial con­
ditions for persuasive process.
4. Although it was deemed necessary to use recorded 
speeches and introductions, there is a potential source of 
error in the use of recordings. The recorded presentation 
is an unnatural one in terms of the speaker-audience 
relationship.
5. It is possible that the speeches, constructed by
the same person, do not reflect the differences which would
be present if a dogmatic and an open-minded person con­
structed the speeches. There are probably a number of subtle 
differences in style, arrangement, arguments, etc., between
a presentation of a dogmatic person and an open-minded person 
which may not be reflected in the speeches used.
6 . It is possible that the introductions of the
various speakers did not affect the experimental group as
they did the pilot study group. The use of similar random­
ized groups is an attempt to eliminate this source of error.
7. It is possible that, in an effort toward experi­
mental precision, the experimenter did not allow for enough 
differences in the construction of the speeches (e.g.— re­
quiring that the same person record both speeches).
It is recognized that all error cannot be eliminated
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or measured by this type of investigation. Such measures as 
were possible have been taken to free the results from error, 
but potential error must always be kept in mind when gener­
alizing from the results or conclusions of any study.
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the sta­
tistical results of the experiment. The discussion will 
consider the mean shift of each cell, the comparative effec­
tiveness of the two main treatments, the relationship be­
tween dogmatism scores and attitude change, the interaction 
effects, a comparison of the individual treatment cells, and 
a summary of the results pertinent to the hypotheses pre­
sented in Chapter II.
Mean Shifts of Cells
As stated in the last chapter, the two factor by 
three levels design was chosen for this experiment because 
it presented the opportunity to investigate the three fac­
tors of primary interest simultaneously. The first factor, 
type of speech, and the second factor, ethos of the speaker, 
are combined with three levels of audience dogmatism to form
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a total of 18 individual cells. The mean shifts of these 
individual cells are reproduced in Table II.
The results of the analysis of variance are shown in 
Table III. This table includes the analysis of shift of at­
titude as reflected by the difference between the pre- and 
post-test scores on the Likert type scale of attitude toward 
Farm Price Supports.
Table III shows a significant difference between in­
troductions and a significant difference between levels of 
audience dogmatism. All other sources of variation, includ­
ing all interaction effects, were not significant. This 
means that the hypothesis which predicted a significant ef­
fect produced by the recipient's dogmatism was confirmed.
The hypothesis which predicted significant changes in atti­
tude based upon the perception of the communicator's credi­
bility was also conformed. All other hypotheses were not 
confirmed. The individual treatment results will be dis­
cussed in later paragraphs.
Relation between Speaker's Ethos 
and Attitude Change
It was hypothesized that the relative effectiveness 
of a communication will vary with the recipient's perception 
of the communicator's ethos or credibility as revealed by
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TABLE II. MEAN SHIFT OF INDIVIDUAL CELLS
Presentation
Ethos of the 
Speaker
Audience
Dogmatism
+
Closed-minded
Speech
6.30 (3)
Open-minded
Speech
8.10 (1)
High 0 6.00 (6) 6.26 (4)
- 2.20 (17) 5.00 (9)
+ 1.30 (18) 3.80 (11)
Low o 2.53 (14) 3.73 (12)
- 2.30 (16) 3.50 (13)
+ 6.40 (2) 6.00 (7)
No introduction o 6.13 (5) 5.06 (8)
- 2.40 (15) 4.00 (10)
Note: + =
o =
( ) =
individual cells containing subjects 
with relatively high dogmatism scores. 
individual cells containing subjects 
with relatively neutral dogmatism 
scores.
individual cells-- containing subjects 
with relatively low dogmatism scores, 
numbers in parenthesis indicate the 
rank order of attitude shift, # 1 being 
the largest shift as indicated by the 
Likert scale on attitudes toward Farm 
Price Supports.
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TABLE III. ANALYSIS 
ATTITUDE AS
OF VARIANCE 
A RESULT OF
OF THE MEAN 
TREATMENTS
SHIFT OF
Source of 
Variation df Mean Square F
Speeches 1 48.58 2.66
Introductions 2 152.75 8.36***
Levels 
(Dogmatism scores)
2 77.02 4.21**
Speeches X Introductions 2 15.29 .84
Speeches X Levels 2 14.72 .80
Introductions X Levels 4 23.19 1.27
Speeches X Levels 
X Introductions 4 5.80 .32
Within Cells 192 18.27
Total 209
*** = significant at the .001 level of confidence. 
.** = significant at the .01 level of confidence.
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the speaker's trustworthiness and expertness. Specifically, 
it was hypothesized that a speaker perceived as being both 
trustworthy and an expert on the subject being presented 
would be more effective in changing attitude than a speaker 
perceived as being neither trustworthy nor an expert.
The test of significance of the main effect of the 
introductions examined the hypothesis that the two intro­
ductions and the speech with no introduction would have the 
same effect on the dependent variable (shift of attitude). 
Again, using the F-test ratio an
analysis of variance this statistical hypothesis was rejected 
with a .001 level of confidence. The effect of the different 
introductions is shown in Table IV.
TABLE IV. TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE OF MEAN SHIFT DIFFERENCE
AMONG INTRODUCTIONS
Introduction No. Mean Shift Difference SE of MD t
High 70 5.71
None 70 5.09
.62 .73 .85
Low 70 2.90
2.19 .73 3.00**
High 70 5.71
2.81 .72 3.90**
** = significant at the .01 level of confidence.
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The t-test was used to investigate the difference 
in the mean shifts among the two introductions and the group 
that was not exposed to an introduction. A significant dif­
ference was found between two of the pairs: between the low
credibility and the high credibility introduction there was 
a significant difference at the .01 level of confidence, and 
between the low credibility introduction and the group re­
ceiving no introduction the difference was also significant 
at the .01 level of confidence. However, there was no signif­
icant difference between the group hearing no speaker intro­
duction and the group hearing the speaker introduced as a 
person of high credibility. This would tend to indicate 
that, while the high credibility introduction caused no sig­
nificant difference in the change of attitude, the reverse 
was not true. That is, the portrayal of the speaker as hav­
ing little credibility did have a significant effect upon 
change of attitude. The results of this test are reproduced 
in Table IV.
Relation between Audience Belief System 
and Attitude Change
Another primary hypothesis of this study was that a 
person's belief system would significantly affect his recep­
tion of a communication. The statistical hypothesis was the
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null hypothesis of no difference in the mean attitude change 
among the various levels. This test was based on the F-ratio 
of the mean squares for levels and the mean square within- 
cells. Table V shows the results of the mean attitude 
change for levels and the resulting F-ratio. In this case 
there was a reliable statistical difference in the mean shift 
of the three audiences at the .01 level of confidence. The 
null hypothesis, that there was no difference in the reac­
tions of subjects at the different levels, was therefore 
rejected.
T-tests were used to investigate the difference be­
tween mean shifts of opinion at the various levels of dogma­
tism. These results are shown in Table V. A significant 
difference was found between two of the pairs ; between the 
neutral and open-minded audience the difference was signifi­
cant at the .05 level of confidence and between the open- 
minded and dogmatic audiences the difference was significant 
at the .01 level of confidence. The difference between the 
dogmatic and neutral audiences was not statistically 
significant.
76
TABLE V. TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE OF MEAN SHIFT DIFFERENCE 
AMONG AUDIENCE POSITIONS
Audience
Position No. Mean Shift Difference SE of MD t
Dogmatic 60 5.31
.35 .69 .50
Neutral 90 4.96
1.73 .72 2.40*
Open-minded 60 3.23
2.08 .72 2.89**
Dogmatic 60 5.31
* = significant at the .05 level of confidence. 
** = significant at the .01 level of confidence
Summary
1. The hypothesis that closed-mindedness or open- 
mindedness existing in the speeches would have a significant 
differential effect on attitude change did not prove statis­
tically significant at the .05 level of confidence.
2. The second hypothesis stated that the relative 
effectiveness of a communication will vary with the recipi­
ent's perception of the communicator's credibility as re­
vealed by the speaker's trustworthiness and expertness. Us­
ing the F-test ratio, this hypothesis was accepted at the 
.01 level of confidence. Using t-tests to investigate 
differences between the credibility levels indicated that:
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(1) there was no significant difference, at the .05 level 
of confidence, between the groups hearing the speaker intro­
duced as being both trustworthy and an expert and the groups 
hearing the speech without an introduction, (2) there was a 
significant difference at the .01 level of confidence be­
tween the group hearing no introduction and the group hearing 
the speaker introduced as having low credibility, and (3) 
there was a significant difference at the .01 level of con­
fidence between the groups hearing the high credibility in­
troduction and the low credibility introduction.
3. The hypothesis that the belief system of the 
receiver would significantly affect the change in attitude 
was borne out. The F-test ratio indicated that the differ­
ence due to varying belief systems was significant at the 
.01 level of confidence. By using the t-test further dif­
ferences were indicated among the three audience levels :
(1) there was no significant difference (.05 level) between 
the dogmatic and the moderate or neutral audience, (2) there 
was a significant difference between the neutral and open-
minded audiences at the .05 level of confidence, and (3) a
difference existed between the open-minded and dogmatic 
audiences at the .01 level of confidence.
4. None of the three double interaction effects nor
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the triple interaction effect proved to be statistically 
significant.
The final chapter will include a summary of the en­
tire experiment, discussion of the results indicated in this 
chapter, implications of these data, and suggestions for 
further study.
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
Summary
This study was concerned with the effect of certain 
variables on the attitude change of groups of listeners.
These variables were : (1) perceived ethos or credibility of
a speaker and (2) the "dogmatism" contained within the speech. 
To make the experimental design more precise and to examine 
another dimension of the variables involved in attitude 
change, the audiences were separated according to their vary­
ing degrees of dogmatism as indicated by their Haiman Dogma­
tism Test scores. The study sought conclusions concerning 
the effects of all combinations of the above factors on atti­
tude change.
A review of the literature revealed considerable re­
search concerning the effect of credibility of the source on 
attitude change. However, no research specifically concern­
ing the dogmatism of the speech and the relationship of this
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dogmatism and credibility of the source to the dogmatism or 
personality structure of the listener is available in cur­
rent literature. This study sought to explore some prelim­
inary hypotheses in this virgin territory.
A total of 210 students enrolled in P. A. 101 (Oral 
Communications) and Psych. 201 (Fundamentals of Psychology) 
courses at the University of Southern Mississippi were used 
as subjects in this experiment. Two speeches favoring the 
abandonment of farm price supports were used as the primary 
persuasive instruments. One speech was constructed along 
"open-minded" lines while the other was constructed to be 
relatively "dogmatic." Introductions were written to iden­
tify the speech as coming from a highly credible source and 
a source of low credibility. In a third condition no in­
troduction at all was used. The audiences were arranged 
according to their score on the Haiman Dogmatism scale into 
three groups considered to be: (1) relatively dogmatic, (2)
relatively neutral, and (3) relatively open-minded or non- 
dogmatic.
The method chosen for measuring attitude and atti­
tude change was a Likert scale concerning attitude toward 
farm price supports. The difference in pre-test and post­
test scores on the Likert scale was the dependent variable.
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In testing the significance of the effect of the 
treatments (introductions and speeches), the three dimen­
sional (A X B X L), two factors by levels design was used 
and the F-test for significance was employed to test the 
statistical hypothesis that the various treatments would 
have the same effect on the mean attitude change. In test­
ing the effect of listener dogmatism on the attitude shift, 
the statistical hypothesis tested was that the difference 
between the various dogmatism positions had no effect on the 
main attitude shift.
Conclusions
It must be pointed out that the results obtained in 
this study can be valid only within the limitations and con­
ditions of the investigation as it was carried out, and that 
the conclusions drawn may be generalized only to those situ­
ations for which this experiment provides a representative 
sampling. With this in mind, the following conclusions are 
presented. These conclusions are based on the mean shift of 
attitude as measured by the Likert scale.
1. There was no significant difference between the 
effects of the two speeches (dogmatic and open-minded) at 
the .05 level of confidence. However, the difference was in
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the direction predicted and would have been significant at 
the .10 level of confidence.
2. The speaker who was perceived as being a rela­
tively credible source was able to obtain a greater shift of 
attitude than was the source whose perceived credibility was 
relatively low.
3. The speeches when presented without an introduc­
tion resulted in a greater shift of attitude than when at­
tributed to a source with low credibility. There was no 
significant difference between effect of speech attributed 
to a highly credible source and the speech not attributed to 
any source.
4. The attitude of the dogmatic audience shifted 
most, that of the neither dogmatic nor open-minded audience 
less, and that of the open-minded audience the least.
5. The double interaction effects between the in­
troductions and speeches, introductions and audience levels, 
and speeches and audience levels were not significant.
6 . The triple interaction effect between speeches, 
audience levels, and introductions was not significant.
Discussion
The findings of this experiment indicate a need for
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further research in the area of personality and persuasion. 
From this study it seems that the belief system of the lis­
tener is a significant factor in the persuasive situation.
A close examination of the various cell means shown in Table 
II of the previous chapter supports this view. It should be 
pointed out to begin with that the total sample population 
was skewed in the closed-minded direction. In order to make 
cell n's proportional the experimenter had to take all of 
the negative scores on the Haiman scale and consider them as 
the open-minded group. These scores ranged from -1 to -34 
while the neutrals ranged from +1 to only +16 and the dog­
matic group ranged from +17 to +36. This points out two 
factors which may have affected the results: (1) the open-
minded group contained a greater variety of belief systems 
as indicated by the Haiman scale and (2) the neutrals were, 
in fact, heavily skewed in the closed-minded direction.
These speculations assume that the Haiman scale is 
an equal interval scale. The specific statement that it is 
could not be found in Haiman's research. However, he con­
tinually uses statistical and mathematical calculations 
which are appropriate for equal interval scales. If this 
scale is not equal interval, then the statements about the 
skewness of the population are not necessarily correct. In
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fact, if the various positions on this scale do not approach 
equal intervals, many of the findings of this study might 
then be artifacts of the scale rather than of the variables 
studied. In the absence of evidence along these lines, it 
might be well to follow Rokeach* s procedure of investigating 
only subjects who score very high or very low on the scale.
Table II indicates that the three cells with the 
most attitude change are all in the relatively dogmatic 
group. We must go to the cell mean ranked 9th out of 18 be­
fore we encounter the first open-minded cell. The eight 
largest shifts-in-attitude cells were, in other words, all 
in relatively closed-minded groups. Another fact about these 
first eight cells is that four of them (ranks 2, 3, 5, and 6) 
heard the closed-minded speech while the other four (ranks 
1, 4, 7, and 8) heard the open-minded speech. Four of these 
first eight were exposed to the highly credible source and 
four to the speech with no introduction. None of the top 
eight cells were in the groups hearing the speaker introduced 
as having little credibility.
Six of the bottom nine cells (having the least shift 
of opinion) were in the group exposed to the speaker with 
low credibility. The other three cell groups of the last 
nine were all composed of non-dogmatic subjects; one hearing
85
the credible introduction and two hearing no introduction.
Several speculations can be made from this review. 
First, there is little difference between the persuasiveness 
of the open-minded and closed-minded speeches. This could 
be attributed to several factors. The speeches were very 
similar in content. They both contained the same arguments, 
arrangements, transitions, and both were recorded by the 
same speaker. A closed-minded person would probably not 
organize his material, use similar transitions, the same in­
tonations, etc., as would the open-minded person. One of 
the shortcomings of this experiment, then, seems to be a 
lack of difference between the two speeches used as the open 
and closed-Toinded stimuli. When the experimenter submitted 
the manuscripts for the open and closed minded speeches to a 
group of seven faculty members and played the tapes to a 
group of twelve graduate students, all nineteen unanimously 
agreed that there was a difference in the speeches and cor­
rectly identified both speeches. In retrospect it is clear 
that this was not an adequate test since the concepts of open 
and closed-mindedness were explained to these two panels be­
fore they were exposed to the speech stimuli; an introduction 
which, of course, was not made to the subjects in the final 
experiment.
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From the point of view of traditional rhetorical 
theory, the open-minded speech is a "better" speech than the 
closed-minded speech. It satisfies the logical canons of a 
basic speech textbook or an argumentation textbook far better 
than the closed-minded speech. If the differences between 
speeches are viewed rhetorically, the results coincide with 
many earlier studies. These studies indicate that changes 
in messages which are rhetorically sound or unsound seem to 
produce differences in response which are not significant 
but are in the direction predicted. The differences between 
open and closed-minded speeches can be thought of as differ­
ences in style, and if thought of in that way, the results 
coincide with previous findings.
Another important question is "where" the experimen­
tal stimuli fell. For example, it seems possible to arrange 
a continuum of speeches on a dimension of open and closed­
mindedness. It is also possible to arrange introductions on 
a dimension of high ethos-low ethos just as people are placed 
on a dimension of high dogmatism-low dogmatism.
One possible way of accounting for a number of re­
sults in this study is by this question of where on the 
potential continuum did the particular selected stimuli fall? 
For example, the Small observed differences in the speeches
87
potentially might be attributed to the fact that they could 
be thought of as falling near each other on a rather long 
continuum. In other words, the small difference noted may 
be a function of the selection of stimuli which fall close 
together on a long continuum.
One of the obvious changes which should be made if 
this experiment were replicated would be in the speech 
stimuli. An effort should be made to get speeches which 
would represent more extreme positions on an open or closed- 
minded continuum, rather than trying to match argument, 
arrangement, etc.
In looking at the effects of the introductions, it 
seems that the introduction which intimated the speaker had 
not been completely trustworthy in the past and might not be 
a "real" expert in farm price supports was effective in 
creating low ethos. The speaker introduced as highly trust­
worthy and an expert in the area of farm price supports did 
not produce results which differed significantly from the 
speech with no introduction. If these results are typical, 
they would indicate that "extrinsic" ethos, that which pre­
cedes the speaker's words, adds little to source credibility. 
However, "extrinsic" ethos does seem to have a powerfully 
damaging effect if it indicates that the speaker has low
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credibility.
The results from the introductions offer room for 
speculation. How can the lack of difference between the 
high credibility introduction and the condition of no intro­
duction be explained? Rokeach repeatedly insists that with 
the closed-minded individual, there seems to be a source- 
concept collapse. The closed-minded individual reacts to 
the source and message as if they were one. It may be im­
possible to create a "source loyalty" situation, in Rokeach's 
sense, with a short introduction. Two different levels of 
reaction may be involved. Consider, for example, results 
obtained in a study by W i l l i a m s T h i s  study investigated 
two components of source credibility, trustworthiness and 
expertness. He created four different introductions using 
trustworthiness and expertness in all possible combinations,
i.e., (1) trustworthy and expert, (2) trustworthy and non­
expert, (3) non-trustworthy and expert, and (4) non- 
trustworthy and non-expert. It was predicted that the ef­
fectiveness of the speeches would vary with their introduc­
tions, and the speech with introduction (1) above would be
^Bill M. Williams, "An Experimental Study of the 
Relative Effect of Trustworthiness and Expertness on Change 
of Attitude," Unpublished M. A. Thesis (University of Okla­
homa, 1962).
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most effective, (2) next most effective, (3) next, and (4) 
least effective. Introductions 1, 3, and 4 were attributed 
to fictitious men. Introduction 2 was attributed to General 
Douglas MacArthur. This introduction clearly pointed out 
that while MacArthur was trustworthy he was definitely not 
an expert in the field under consideration (compulsory health 
insurance). The results indicated that MacArthur was signif­
icantly more persuasive than even the fictitious man who was 
introduced as being both trustworthy and expert.
These findings seem to support the idea that high 
credibility may be impossible to establish in a short intro­
duction- -that high credibility must be built over a period 
of time and experiences. On the other hand, low credibility 
might be established in a few sentences of introduction.
There is, however, some confusion as to the applica­
tion of the terms "extrinsic" and "intrinsic" ethos. If we 
apply the Aristotelian notion that there is a kind of ethos 
which the speaker creates for himself in his speaking, then 
everything done in this study falls outside that category 
and is "extrinsic" ethos. A man introducing a speaker and 
identifying him as a lawyer is, from this point of view, the 
same thing as identifying him as General MacArthur in a simi­
lar introduction. There are, of course, factors of stability,
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previous experience, and established attitudes; but these 
seem to be neither "extrinsic" nor "intrinsic." It seems 
possible, then, that here is a place where our system of 
categories needs refinement.
It may be, as noted, that the high credibility in­
troduction actually fell rather near the middle of the high- 
low credibility continuum. Therefore, we might not expect a 
large difference between the "high credibility" and the "no 
introduction" treatments.
Another observation is the fact that the dogmatic 
audience experienced a greater change in attitude than did 
the open-minded audience. There seem to be several possible 
explanations for this phenomenon. First, as pointed out in 
Chapter III in the discussion of the Haiman scale, the 
closed-minded person may be acquiescing rather than exper­
iencing a change in attitude. Secondly, Rokeach states that 
one characteristic of open-minded people is that they can 
entertain more behavioral alternatives ; they are "open" to 
more points of view than the closed-minded person. The data 
of this experiment might be reconciled to Rokeach's findings 
if there is a difference in being able to entertain ideas 
and being convinced by ideas. Rokeach does not discuss 
whether or not there is a difference in being able to enter-
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tain ideas and susceptibility to attitude change. More re­
search seems justified on this point; for example, studies 
could be designed which would distinguish between acquies­
cence and agreement, or between entertaining alternatives 
and accepting them.
Hovland, ^  ah., in their book Personality and Per- 
suasibility, suggest another possibility when they point out 
that ". . . there is such a factor as general persuasibility 
and . . . there is evidence that persuasibility exists as a 
'content-free' f a c t o r . T h e y  further found that one char­
acteristic of a person with high persuasibility was pressure 
felt toward group conformity and adaptation.3 This charac­
teristic, according to Rokeach, is also indicative of a 
relatively closed-minded or dogmatic person. If, then, the 
dogmatic people in this experiment possessed attributes of 
general persuasibility, we should expect the dogmatic audi­
ences to be affected more by the communication than the open- 
minded subjects.
Probably the most puzzling result to come from this 
experiment was the extreme lack of interaction at any of the
2
Carl I. Hovland and Irving L. Janis, Personality 
and Persuasibility (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959),
p. 255.
^Ibid., p. 235.
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levels. Specifically, it was predicted in hypothesis IV-B 
that there would be a levels by speeches interaction. Sta­
tistically this interaction was not significant. As men­
tioned above, it is possible that the speeches were drawn 
from a relatively small area of the potential open and closed­
mindedness scale and the subjects may have been drawn from a 
relatively constricted area of the dogmatism scale. If this 
is the case, it is possible that all the theoretical condi­
tions which would lead a person to predict an interaction 
might concern themselves with treatment combinations which 
are "outside" the limits of the variables in this study.
This speculation would lead to the suggestion that a further 
study could tap a much wider range of these variables.
The same comments might be made regarding the intro­
duction by levels interaction predicted in hypothesis IV-A.
In this case, if the high credibility introduction fell more 
toward the end of the high-low credibility continuum, it 
seems probable that there would have been significant inter­
action between audience levels and introductions. For ex­
ample, if the high credibility introduction had cited, as 
the source, an authority figure for highly dogmatic people, 
an introduction by levels interaction would have been more 
likely. In other words, this study may not have tapped the
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portion of the scale where interaction is most likely to 
occur, if it occurs anywhere.
If this experiment were replicated, there are certain 
changes which obviously should be made. The first change 
might be in the stimulus material. Tape recordings are an 
artificial means of communication. Ideally, to test the 
hypotheses of this study, one would have subjects who are ex­
posed to a "live" speaker who is extremely open-minded while 
another group is exposed to a speaker who is extremely 
closed-minded. This certainly would not be an impossible 
task in the political field. For example, speeches made by 
Tom Anderson, right wing editor of the Farm and Ranch Maga­
zine, seem to have many characteristics of closed-minded 
speeches. A speech by him against the "present administra­
tion" might be compared with other anti-administrâtion 
speeches given by more open-minded people. If this were not 
possible, then tapes of actual speeches before real audiences 
might be an improvement over the artificially constructed 
ones used in this experiment. The experimenter feels that 
one of the weakest areas in this study is in the lack of 
difference between the two speech stimuli.
One advantage this experiment did have was the free­
dom to assign subjects to different groups rather than using
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"available” subjects. This made the experimenter's job 
easier and should have increased the precision of this 
experiment.
Implications
This experiment has several implications for speech 
pedagogy and practices First of all, to the extent that the 
experimental sample is typical, speakers should be aware that 
our audiences tend to be closed-minded. Of the total popula­
tion receiving the Haiman scale to measure dogmatism, the 
closed-minded group outnumbered the open-minded group by more 
than 2 to 1, and extremely high closed-minded scores were 
more common than extremely open-minded scores.
Another implication, which seems to be borne out in 
other studies, is the effect the speaker's ethos has on a 
persuasive situation.
In summary, the important implication which this 
experiment expresses is the need for more study in the area 
of personality and persuasion. In view of the questions 
posed on page 10 of Chapter I it seems that:
1. Psychological theories can provide rhetoric 
with new insights into the analysis of speech 
behavior.
2. Speech behavior can be studied without first 
employing traditional rhetorical categories.
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3. Personality structure of listeners does have 
significant effects on the outcome of a per­
suasive message.
Suggestions for Further Study
This study is similar to most other research studies 
in that it has raised many questions. Some of the questions 
are worthy of investigation and further study. The more 
promising ones are indicated below.
1. The question of the lack of difference between 
speeches seems to offer a fruitful area for more study. A 
more realistic situation where two different speakers who 
give their own composition on the same subject might be used 
instead of having the same person record both speeches.
These speakers, of course, should be relatively far apart on 
the dogmatism scale.
2. In line with number one, a number of speeches 
might be analyzed to define characteristic differences in 
speeches composed by open and closed-minded speakers. This 
might be done using methods such as content analysis, etc.
3. Further examination is needed to determine why 
these interactions are insignificant when other studies 
would lead one to expect interaction between the dimensions 
used in this study.
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4. Important results might come from further at­
tempts to define and measure the dimensions of dogmatism as 
reflected in the content, arrangement, and delivery of a 
speech.
5. There could be replications of this experiment 
using only extremely dogmatic and extremely open-minded sub­
jects without the general overlapping present in the neutral 
group in this study.
6 . Profitable investigations might be made to de­
termine the potential width of the continua dealt with in 
this study.
7. This study might logically be extended by defin­
ing more precisely the differences in source credibility to 
obtain more accurate information about the possible inter­
action effects of different kinds of credibility and dogma­
tism on personality structure.
8 . Studies designed specifically to investigate 
the question of the amount of benefit or damage done by com­
plimentary or adverse introductions seem warranted. Are the 
implications of the results of this study valid when they 
indicate that little good but much harm may be done by the 
introduction?
9. Profitable findings might come from studies
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investigating the similarities and differences between 
Rokeach's conception of open and closed-mindedness and Hov- 
land's general persuasibility notions as applied to the per­
suasive situation.
Although the field of source credibility and person­
ality structure as related to persuasion has received little 
attention in the past years, this seems, to this experi­
menter, a most promising field which offers the possibility 
of insights into the persuasive situation.
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RAW SCORE DATA
SUMMARY OF DATA AND RAW-SCORES
Audience, -D speech. Hi Introduction, Dogmatic subject
Subject
No. Sex Age Class
Pre­
test
Post­
test Shift
Dogmatism
score
1. F 19 2 64 48 16 +28
2 . F 18 1 66 68 - 2 +22
3. M 18 1 62 50 12 +36
4. F 18 1 66 51 11 +19
5. M 18 1 44 31 13 +23
6 . M 19 32 30 2 +18
7. M 21 4 30 16 14 +20
8. M 22 1 54 45 9 +21
9. M 18 1 38 31 7 +22
10. F 18 1 55 56 - 1 +33
Audience, -D speech. Hi Introduction, Neutral subject
1 . M 41 3 35 30 5 + 6
2 . M 21 2 59 48 11 + 1
3. M 25 4 57 47 10 + 2
4. M 18 1 60 51 9 + 8
5. M 18 1 68 60 8 + 8
6 . F 26 4 59 59 0 +12
7. M 20 2 48 42 6 +15
8 . F 18 1 48 40 8 +13
9. M 21 4 33 22 11 + 4
10. M 22 2 34 36 - 2 + 6
11. M 21 2 33 28 5 +13
12. M 21 2 32 26 6 +14
13. M 21 1 39 43 - 4 +16
14. F 19 1 66 57 9 +16
15. F 20 2 65 53 12 +16
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Audience, -D speech. Hi Introduction, Non-dogmatic subjects
Subject
No. Sex Age Class
Pre­
test
Post-
test Shift
Dogmatism
score
1. M 18 1 52 53 - 1 - 3
2 . F 20 4 59 56 3 - 3
3. M 24 4 44 37 7 - 3
4. M 22 4 27 18 9 - 5
5. M 24 1 61 62 - 1 -10
6 . M 18 1 73 65 8 -10
7. M 18 1 52 43 9 -11
8 . M 19 1 33 26 7 -15
9. F 19 1 67 63 4 -31
10. F 20 46 41 5 -20
Audience, -D speech. Low introduction, Dogmatic subjects
1 . M 18 1 47 38 9 +20
2 . M 20 1 51 53 - 2 +24
3. M 19 1 50 44 6 +24
4. M 21 52 46 6 +27
5. F 18 1 51 42 9 +27
6. M 20 49 45 4 +30
7. M 18 1 58 55 3 +28
8. F 18 1 41 46 - 5 +33
9. F 18 1 41 37 4 +33
10. M 19 1 48 44 4 +35
Audience, -D speech. Low introduction, Neutral subjects
1 . M 20 1 30 21 9 + 2
2 . M 18 1 46 51 - 5 + 3
3. F 18 1 49 41 8 + 4
4. F 18 1 56 46 10 + 4
5. F 19 1 46 51 - 5 + 5
6 . M 22 4 30 25 5 + 6
7. F 19 1 61 54 7 +12
8 . M 19 1 60 51 9 +13
9. M 19 1 46 47 - 1 +17
10. M 26 2 38 38 0 + 1
11. M 20 3 52 44 8 +10
12. M 21 3 48 44 4 +11
13. F 19 3 60 57 3 +14
14. M 19 1 64 66 - 2 +17
15. F 20 2 44 38 6 +14
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Audience , -D speech. Low introduction. Non-dogmatic subjects
Subject
No. Sex Age Class
Pre­
test
Post­
test Shift
Dogmatism
score
1 . M 18 1 46 38 8 - 1
2 . F 18 1 51 50 1 -11
3. F 19 1 49 43 6 -29
4. M 18 1 52 47 5 - 6
5. M 20 1 53 44 9 - 4
6 . F 18 1 50 54 -4 - 5
7. F 18 1 58 51 7 - 1
8 . M 21 2 23 22 1 -17
9. M 20 1 61 62 - 1 -18
10. F 27 1 53 50 3 -27
Audience,'-D speech. No introduction. Dogmatic subjects
1 . M 20 1 45 38 7 +23
2 . F 19 1 64 58 6 +25
3. M 20 2 45 38 7 +28
4. F 19 2 48 39 9 +36
5. M 20 1 57 59 -2 +18
6 . F 39 1 64 58 6 +21
7. M 19 2 35 31 4 +24
8 . F 20 4 58 50 8 +18
9. M 20 2 42 36 6 +19
10. M 19 1 60 51 9 +20
Audience, -D speech. No introduction. Neutral subjects
1. F 20 1 63 54 9 + 4
2 . F 19 3 62 54 8 + 7
3. M 19 1 60 52 8 +14
4. M 23 4 60 57 3 + 7
5. M 18 1 59 50 9 +12
6 . F 22 4 53 49 4 + 5
7. F 18 1 63 64 -1 + 6
8 . F 20 2 63 61 2 + 9
9. F 18 1 54 45 9 + 9
10. F 21 3 47 46 1 + 9
11. F 18 1 55 47 8 +12
12. F 18 1 54 47 8 +12
13. M 19 2 57 48 9 +16
14. F 18 1 43 44 -1 +16
15. M 19 1 50 40 10 +17
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Audience , -D speech, :No introduction. Non-dogmatic subjects
Subject
No. Sex Age Class
Pre­
test
Post­
test Shift
Dogmatism
score
1 . F 19 1 58 49 9 - 1
2 . M 20 2 61 55 6 - 4
3. M 19 1 55 53 2 - 6
4. M 21 1 50 51 -1 - 6
5. M 20 2 60 57 3 - 7
6 . F 19 2 52 48 4 - 9
7. M 18 1 39 40 -1 -12
8. M 19 1 43 38 5 -13
9. M 21 1 49 43 6 -13
10. F 20 2 55 48 7 -14
Audience, +D speech, Hi introduction. Dogmatic subjects
1 . M 21 2 54 48 8 +19
2 . F 20 3 67 60 7 +22
3. M 18 1 53 48 5 +22
4. F 18 2 59 51 8 +30
5. M 20 2 70 64 6 +14
6 . M 18 1 36 26 10 +22
7. M 18 1 74 68 6 +25
8 . M 19 1 37 36 1 +26
9. F 19 2 54 50 4 +29
10. F 20 2 66 58 8 +38
Audience, +D speech, Hi introduction. Neutral subjects
1 . M 19 2 63 57 6 + 9
2 . F 18 1 59 51 8 + 9
3. F 18 1 55 58 -3 +12
4. M 19 1 48 60 8 +11
5. M 20 3 40 35 5 +13
6 . M 19 1 59 55 4 + 5
7. F 20 2 55 45 10 + 8
8 . M 20 2 54 46 8 +11
9. F 18 2 60 51 9 +11
10. F 18 1 58 49 9 +14
11. M 18 1 39 36 3 +14
12. M 20 2 47 40 7 +16
13. F 19 1 64 59 5 +17
14. M 20 1 55 50 5 +14
15. M 19 1 48 42 6 + 8
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Audience , +D speech. Hi introduction. Non-dogmatic subjects
Subject
No. Sex Age Class
Pre­
test
Post­
test Shift
Dogmatism
score
1 . F 20 4 37 33 4 - 1
2 . M 19 2 51 60 1 - - 8
3. F 19 1 53 56 -3 -11
4. M 20 3 44 46 -2 -40
5. M 22 4 33 25 8 0
6 . F 18 1 42 33 9 - 2
7. M 18 1 45 42 3 - 2
8 . F 18 1 66 66 0 - 6
9. F 18 1 69 68 1 - 9
10. F 18 1 47 46 1 -29
Audience, +D speech. Low introduction. Dogmatic subjects
1. F 20 1 58 53 5 +18
2 . F 20 2 31 36 -5 +18
3. M 19 1 29 31 -2 +20
4. M 20 2 59 55 4 +22
5. M 20 4 66 57 9 +22
6 . M 19 1 53 60 -7 +23
7. M 18 1 56 50 6 +25
8 . M 18 1 49 49 0 +26
9. M 18 1 58 53 5 +33
10. F 19 2 30 32 -2 +28
Audience, +D speech. Low introduction. Neutral subjects
1. F 19 1 61 65 -4 + 2
2 . F 18 1 50 47 3 + 7
3. F 18 1 50 45 5 + 8
4. M 21 4 32 35 -3 + 9
5. M 21 3 54 54 0 +12
6 . M 27 4 54 66 -2 +15
7. M 21 1 62 58 4 +15
8 . F 19 1 66 60 6 + 4
9. F 19 2 53 51 2 + 4
10. F 18 1 47 40 7 + 6
11. F 20 2 56 48 8 + 8
12. M 18 1 61 56 5 +11
13. M 18 1 57 49 8 + 3
14. M 18 1 53 53 0 + 5
15. F 19 1 45 46 -1 + 8
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Audience, +D speech. Low introduction. Non-dogmatic subjects
Subject 
No. Sex Age Class
Pre­
test
Post­
test Shift
Dogmatism
score
1 . F 46 4 45 36 9 - 1
2 . F 20 2 47 43 4 - 7
3. M 21 2 43 46 -3 -17
4. F 18 1 56 52 4 * 8
5. M 25 4 46 43 3 -13
6 . F 18 1 50 46 4 -16
7. M 20 1 63 58 5 -19
8. F 19 2 29 30 -1 - 1
9. M 19 1 58 60 -2 - 6
10. M 19 2 57 57 0 -10
Audience, +D speech. No introduction. Dogmatic subjects
1 . M 19 1 52 46 6 +32
2 . F 19 1 55 45 10 +25
3. M 22 4 48 50 -2 +31
4. M 21 3 50 41 9 +28
5. M 44 4 33 26 7 +22
6 . M 21 1 51 43 8 +31
7. F 21 4 63 55 8 +36
8 . M 24 2 47 41 6 +26
9. F 18 1 38 31 7 +27
10. M 19 2 46 41 5 +22
Audience, H-D speech. No introduction. Neutral subjects
1. M 19 1 56 49 7 + 2
2 . M 20 1 60 55 5 + 2
3. F 19 1 57 48 9 + 3
4. M 19 1 47 50 -3 + 3
5. F 19 2 51 41 10 + 7
6 . M 25 4 53 46 7 +10
7. F 21 2 66 60 6 + 6
8 . M 18 1 58 51 7 +12
9. M 19 1 59 54 5 +17
10. M 20 4 60 50 10 + 1
11. F 35 3 44 36 8 + 4
12. M 28 4 53 47 6 + 5
13. F 21 2 58 63 -5 + 7
14. M 20 2 40 32 8 + 8
15. F 46 3 61 48 13 +14
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Audience, +D speech. No introduction. Non-dogmatic subjects
Subject 
No. Sex Age Class
Pre­
test
Post­
test Shift
Dogmatism
score
1 . F 19 2 46 43 3 -11
2 . F 18 1 32 52 0 - 1
3. M 18 1 43 42 1 - 2
4. F 18 1 54 51 3 -11
5. M 19 1 69 63 6 -11
6 . M 18 1 57 55 2 -35
7. M 19 1 34 31 3 -10
8. M 18 1 43 40 3 -14
9. M 21 1 39 38 1 -18
10. F 18 1 41 39 2 -19
Control Audience, No speech. No introduction. Random subjects
1. F 19 2 64 60 4 +28
2 . M 40 3 35 38 - 3 + 6
3. M 24 4 44 44 0 - 3
4. F 18 1 33 38 - 5 +27
5. M 21 1 25 27 - 2 + 6
6. M 20 2 57 50 7 +12
7. F 18 1 33 32 1 + 5
8. M 22 1 33 32 1 - 3
9. M 21 2 39 37 2 - 1
10. M 21 2 57 63 - 6 +16
11. M 19 1 51 46 5 + 9
12. F 19 2 45 55 -10 + 6
13. M 19 1 55 61 - 6 +23
14. M 21 2 43 40 3 - 7
15. M 18 1 50 50 0 + 7
16. M 18 1 36 44 - 8 + 9
17. M 22 2 47 49 - 2 + 1
18. M 20 2 64 62 2 +21
19. M 19 1 42 43 - 1 +11
20. F 23 4 51 48 3 - 4
21. F 22 3 42 40 2 + 7
22. M 34 3 32 34 - 2 -10
Control group mean shift = -.82.
APPENDIX B
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DOGMATIC SPEECH
No problem demands more urgent attention than this 
one. The current program has become a disaster. Both of 
these statements refer to a problem which is termed "the in­
solvable farm mess
The present program is one of parity price supports. 
A so called "fair" ratio of farm income to farm expenses is 
arbitrarily established. This is then labeled "parity."
Crop prices are then guaranteed by law at some percentage of 
this parity through government loans or purchases.
Although everyone agrees on the desirability of an 
adequate farm income, the present system has not achieved 
this for many farmers. I haven't had much direct experience 
on the farm but the solution seems clear. Yet, some poli­
ticians seem to think continuing or expanding the present 
system will achieve this goal. However, the real problem 
which is one of increasing economic opportunities for the 
marginal farmers is ignored. Let us examine the causes for 
the failure of the present system despite its great cost, 
then indicate a solution to the problem.
It is rather obvious price supports haven't worked. 
For several years after the war we were under the influence 
of high rigid price supports but farm income declined sev­
eral billion dollars. And despite all the ups and downs 
since then, this decline has generally continued. Recently, 
gross farm incomes declined a few percentage points with 
production expenses rising a few percentage points. This 
cost-price squeeze represents a considerable drop in net 
farm income.
The history of price support programs since they 
came into being sometime around the 1930's should have indi­
cated the error of relying on price supports. I would think
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that anyone with any understanding of the problem must have 
realized that the government programs didn't have anything 
to do with solving the farm problems of the 1930's. World 
War II and the weather were the means of solving the agricul­
tural problems of the 1930's.
Despite their lack of success in raising farm income, 
these price support programs have been expensive. I would 
suppose that there are some hidden costs which could make the 
total difficult to estimate. Personally, I would guess that 
the present support policies have cost us between twenty-five 
and thirty-five billion dollars in the last seven or eight 
years. This represents a rather good percentage of our non­
defense budget. Also, every time we go to the grocery store 
we pay a little more because of price supports. For some 
people in various sections of the United States, these prices 
contribute further to an already inadequate diet.
If price supports had helped the farmers perhaps this 
cost would be justified. We already know that the programs 
are ineffective. The farmer does not benefit for two reasons. 
First, much of the money expended never reaches the farmer. 
The money is spent for foreign disposal at a loss (while our 
farm exports decline), for storage costs, for interest on 
borrowed money. The government lends individuals money to 
build storage facilities and then pays rents that assure a 
high profit for these people. With all the expenses that our 
farm program encounters, I estimate that less than half of 
the money that is spent ever gets back to the farmer. And 
this may be a conservative estimate.
Secondly, price supports necessarily raise total 
farm costs. I suppose this idea will be particularly dis­
turbing for farm leaders who have advocated price support 
programs. Why is this true? As far as I have heard, current 
parity price supports are paid on farm crops but not on live­
stock products for the most part. Yet, more than half of the 
farm income comes from livestock and livestock products and 
less than half from farm crops. I don't know just what the 
relationship is between the cost of feed crops and the cost 
of raising beef cattle, but price supports have to be in­
creasing the costs of the farmer. We raise the production 
costs of many farmers to benefit the few. And, as we shall 
see, these few are not the farmers truly in need.
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Stated sinq>ly, then, average farm income has de­
clined fairly constantly under price support programs while 
increased taxes, higher consumer prices, and higher produc­
tion costs for the farmer resulted from the program. There 
isn't any sure way to estimate the loss to farmers from de­
struction of foreign markets and lowered domestic sales.
This failure of parity price supports is explained 
by two basic factors which have been neglected. First, 
American agriculture is becoming fantastically productive. 
Second, many fairmers can not participate in such productiv­
ity because they lack adequate land, financing, or education 
to adopt these practices— these become the marginal farmers.
Comparing our recent farm productivity with that of 
earlier in the century shows that we have increased produc­
tivity sharply and that it is rising even more sharply. 
Somebody's estimate that farm productivity has increased two 
or three times seems to be conservative to me.
Today's production rate is only the beginning. We 
had the greatest crop production in history on the fewest 
acres recently. Production from present acreage can be 
doubled by known good farming practices. A seventy-five per 
cent increase could be expected through a moderate increase 
in the use of fertilizers alone according to some sources. 
Items in the farm revolution include such things as machines, 
power, crop and livestock improvement. There are books 
available which present description of the explosive poten­
tial of the family sized farm.
This ability to produce makes guaranteed price 
levels, even at eighty per cent of parity, high profit in­
centives for efficient farms and ensures production far in 
excess of what can be consumed. So, the government stock­
piles of surpluses increase each year. We now spend huge 
sums of money to store all these useless surpluses. But 
many farmers do not earn such profits for they cannot pro­
duce at anything like an efficient level. These are the 
marginal farmers who present the real farm problem.
Some very high percentages of our crop and livestock 
products are said to be produced by less than half of the 
farmers of our country. And this trend is surely going to 
become even more pronounced which will make these figures
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grow even more startling. Now of the half that produce, say 
ten per cent of our products, some of these are part-time 
farmers. Some must be retired I would assume. But the re­
mainder constitute the marginal farmers. Many are concen­
trated in the South. Why, everybody knows that farmers in 
southern states such as Mississippi, Alabama, Tennessee, West 
Virginia, and South Carolina have among the lowest farm in­
comes in the nation. A man sharecropping fifteen acres of 
red clay with half the crop going to the owner is not going 
to be helped by any level of price supports.
Unfortunately, the government has not adequately 
publicized this group. At least, I haven't seen much infor­
mation from the government on this aspect of the issue. But 
the government does know that inadequate farms and inadequate 
education (even complete illiteracy) make this group of 
farmers largely incapable of economic farm practices. I am 
sure there must be a survey to show that educational level 
correlates highly with acceptance of productive ideas, there­
fore with income.
This marginal famner constitutes a more difficult and 
serious problem than the chronic unençloyment in a few of our 
cities. This presents a real problem for the Kennedy Ad­
ministration to do something about.
The inflation of wartime did not even touch this de­
pressed group and the problem has persisted to the present 
time. Farm leaders certainly recognize these people as a 
problem. A friend of mine was putting it most simply when he 
said that these people present a relief problem, not a farm 
problem.
What are the living conditions of these farmers?
They live in a slum that is ignored because there is open 
space between one slum home and the next. In stark contrast 
there are those farmers who can in one year pay cash for a 
new car, television, refrigerator, and bedroom suite.
How do we meet the needs of the marginal farmer? We 
can do away with the expensive price support programs that 
do nothing to meet his needs. The productive family farm can 
meet the adjustments this action will cause for the limited 
group who have been helped by supports. In the past farmers 
have lost such support payments and they have nevertheless
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increased their profit margins. We have many groups recom­
mending the removal of the artificial price elements from 
agriculture and have been doing so ever since World War II. 
They recommend substituting enphasis on research as the best 
solution to meet economic changes. There isn't an economist 
who would not concur in the recommendation for expansion of 
research and other adjustment methods.
The marginal farmers can be helped in two ways--by 
efforts in increasing their productivity— while lowering pro­
duction costs or by reeducation and relocation for new occu­
pations. Now, I don't know anything about the operation of 
most of the present programs but they are operating with 
limited funds which should be expanded. In helping these 
people we truly increase the economic health of the entire 
nation for they can become a productive asset, not a continu­
ing liability.
These marginal farmers must be as ready as anyone in 
the nation to profit from opportunities for improvement.
There are surely many examples which could be found to illus­
trate this. But they need help in order to adopt these 
opportunities.
So, I think the solution is quite clear. Remove the 
useless program of parity price supports while increasing the 
variety of present services that are shown to be effective 
aids. While I don't know too much about the available types 
of programs, I know that they can do the job. Use a portion 
of the money saved to provide programs to directly meet the 
needs of the marginal farmers, the real farm problem.
I am sure that current programs and proposals can 
meet the problems that these recommendations might bring.
The solution to these problems will take time. But, I submit, 
if we do not take these steps, the nation must continue to 
pay the cost of such neglect of human welfare for a long time.
OPEN-MINDED SPEECH
"No problem demands more urgent attention," declared 
Eisenhower in a 1956 message to Congress. "The current pro­
gram has become a disaster," headlined Time in an October 
lead article. If you have been following this problem as I 
have, you too have noticed many such statements about what is 
now termed that "insolvable farm mess."
The present program is one of parity price supports. 
Congress by.law arbitrarily establishes a "fair" ratio of 
farm income to farm expenses which is then labeled "parity." 
Crop prices are then guaranteed by law at some percentage of 
this parity through government loans and purchases.
Although everyone agrees on the desirability of an 
adequate farm income, the present program has not achieved 
this for many farmers. Yet, some politicians seem to think 
continuing or expanding the present system will. However, 
the real problem which is one of increasing economic oppor­
tunities for the marginal farmers is ignored. Let us examine 
the causes for the failure of the present system despite its 
great cost, then indicate a solution to the problem.
It is rather obvious price supports at whatever 
level haven't worked. Harry Truman's Secretary of Agricul­
ture reported that under high rigid price supports, farm 
income declined steadily from seventeen billion in 1945 to 
ten and one-half billion in 1952. Despite the ups and downs 
of the agricultural statistics since then, the decline has 
generally continued. In 1959 alone, despite price supports, 
conservation acreages, and so on, gross farm incomes de­
clined three and one-half per cent with production expenses 
rising an equal amount. This cost-price squeeze represents 
a considerable drop in net farm incomes.
The history of price supports since that twelfth of 
May, 1933, brought us the ill-fated Agricultural Adjustment
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Act, should have indicated the error of relying on price 
supports. Those of you who had parents on the farm as I did 
or who fanned through the depression have long anticipated 
the statistical demonstration of historian Gilbert Fite of 
Oklahoma in his proof that weather and World War II, not the 
government, solved the 1930 farm problem.
Dispite their lack of success in raising farm income, 
these price support programs have been expensive. Hidden 
costs make the total difficult to estimate. Senator Stuart 
Symington of Missouri, who has generally opposed lower flex­
ible supports in favor of higher, rigid ones, nevertheless 
estimated that the less costly lower supports cost thirty- 
one billion tax dollars in seven years. This represents al­
most twenty per cent of our non-defense budget. Every time 
we go to the grocery store we pay a little more because of 
price supports. And, what worries me even more, these prices 
contribute further to an already inadequate diet for some 
Americans.
If price support had helped the farmers perhaps this 
cost would be justified. We have already seen that the pro­
grams are ineffective. The farmer does not benefit for two 
reasons. First, much of the money expended never reaches the 
farmer. The money is spent for foreign disposal at a loss 
(while our farm exports decline), for storage costs, for 
interest on borrowed money. Those stories in which the gov­
ernment has lent individuals money to build storage facili­
ties, then paid rents that assured a high profit are un­
fortunately all too true. Less than fifty per cent of the 
total spent ever reaches the farmer estimates the American 
Enterprise Association. And my research indicates that this 
may be too conservative.
Secondly, price supports necessarily raise total 
farm costs. In discussions I find this idea particularly 
disturbs farm leaders who advocate price support programs. 
Now, why is it true? Price supports are currently paid on 
some crops but not livestock or livestock products except 
wool. Now, the 1950 Census showed 54.9 per cent of farm in­
come coming from livestock items, 44.5 per cent from crops.
I spent too many years of ny youth shoveling c o m  into feed 
bunks for fat cattle not to realize what a few cents extra 
per bushel of feed can do to the cost of raising a truckload 
of fat cattle. We raise the production costs of many
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farmers to benefit the few. And, as we shall see, these few 
are not the farmers truly in need.
Stated simply, then, average farm income has de­
clined fairly constantly under price support programs while 
increased taxes, higher consumer prices, and higher produc­
tion costs for the farmer resulted from the program. And 
there is no valid way to estimate the loss to farmers from 
destruction of foreign markets and lowered domestic sales.
This failure of parity price supports is explained by 
two basic factors which have been neglected. First, American 
agriculture is becoming fantastically productive. Secondly, 
many farmers can not participate in such productivity because 
they lack adequate land, financing, or education to adopt 
these practices— these become the marginal farmers.
Using 1935 to 1939 as a base of one hundred, farm 
productivity rose to 144 by 1952; and is rising ever more 
sharply. I think Walter Wilcos, Agricultural Specialist of 
the Legislative Reference Bureau was far too conservative in 
his much quoted figure that farm workers today produce 2.7 
times as much per hour as in 1910.
Today’s production rate is only the beginning. Last 
year saw the greatest crop production in history on the few­
est acres. Production from present acreage can be doubled 
by known good farming practices— a seventy-five per cent in­
crease could be expected through a moderate increase in the 
use of fertilizer alone, according to the report of the 
President’s Materials Policy Commission.
Having lived and worked with farms for most of my 
life, I have seen much of this revolution in machines, power, 
crop and livestock improvement. Perhaps the best book I 
have read on the explosive potentials of the family sized 
farm is the 1960 Yearbook of Agriculture: Power to Produce.
This ability to produce makes guaranteed price 
levels, even at eighty per cent of parity, high profit in­
centives for efficient farms and ensures production far in 
excess of what can be consumed. So, the government stock­
piles of surpluses increase each year. We now spend over 
one million dollars a day to store these surpluses says 
agriculture Secretary Freeman but many farmers do not earn
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such profits for they cannot produce at anything like an 
efficient level. There are the marginal farmers who present 
the real farm problem.
Some ninety per cent of our agricultural products 
are produced by less than half of the farmers according to 
the 1950 census. Observation of the farm belt and estimates 
from the 1960 census indicate the percentage is even more 
striking today. Of the fifty per cent who produce less than 
ten per cent of our products, about half are part-time farm­
ers with other sources of income. Some are retired. But the 
remainder constitute the marginal farmers. Many of these are 
concentrated in the South. Net farm incomes in Mississippi, 
Alabama, Tennessee, West Virginia and South Carolina averaged 
less than fifteen hundred dollars in 1959. A man sharecrop­
ping fifteen acres of red clay with half the crop going to 
the owner is not going to be helped by any level of price 
supports.
Unfortunately, the government has not publicized 
this marginal farm group. Only technical reports have ade­
quately treated the problem; for exanq)le, a USDA and Census 
Bureau report of 1959 concluded: "Inadequate farms and in­
adequate education including complete illiteracy make this 
group of farmers largely incapable of economic farm prac­
tices." A survey by Edward Moe of Cornell Extension showed 
that educational level correlates highly with acceptance of 
productive ideas, therefore with income.
This marginal farmer constitutes a more difficult 
and serious problem than the chronic unemployment in a few 
of our cities. This is according to liberal economist 
Arthur Bums in his analysis of the problems facing the 
Kennedy Administration.
Even James Patten of the Farmer's Union who gets 
rather vehement in his support of the present system notes 
this marginal group was not helped by the wartime price rise 
of the support programs of today. Perhaps family friend 
Frank Miller, a Professor at Missouri, put it most simply 
when he said, "these people present a relief problem, not a 
farm problem."
I have seen these farmers. They live in a slum that 
is ignored because there is open space between one slum home
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and the next. In stark contrast, my brother Harold farms 
four hundred acres near Harlan, Iowa. He paid cash this 
year for a new car, television, refrigerator, and bedroom 
suite.
Now, how do we meet the needs of the marginal farmer? 
We can do away with the expensive price support programs that 
do nothing to meet his needs. The productive family can meet 
adjustments this action will cause for the limited group who 
have been helped by supports. I watched with interest the 
success of the dairy industry in increasing profit margins 
after removal of dairy price supports. I have long concurred 
with the recommendation of the Special Committee of the Land 
Grant Colleges, first made way back in 1944, that removal of 
artificial price supports and greater emphasis on research 
techniques is the best way to meet the economic changes. I 
know of no economist who would not concur in the recommenda­
tion for expansion of research and other adjustment methods 
whatever his view on price support programs.
The marginal farmers can be helped in two ways--by 
efforts to increase their production while lowering produc­
tion costs, or by reeducation and relocation for new occupa­
tions . Both Kennedy and Nixon suggested we should expand 
the very limited funds currently available for such programs. 
In helping these people we truly increase the economic health 
of the entire nation for they can become a productive asset, 
not a continuing liability.
The extension service of the Department of Agricul­
ture testifies that these marginal farmers are ready to 
profit from such opportunities. Look what the broiler indus­
try did for some Southern farmers. But these people need 
help in order to adopt these opportunities.
So I think the solution is quite clear. Remove the 
useless program of parity price supports while increasing 
the extension services, the credit facilities, the research 
techniques that have been shown to be effective aids. Use a 
portion of the money saved to expand the program now directly 
meeting the needs of the marginal farmer, the real farm 
problem.
I have not meant to suggest that these solutions are 
panaceas nor that they will work overnight. There will be
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difficult adjustments but I think these adjustment problems 
can be met through available programs. The solution to 
these problems will take time. But, I submit, if we do not 
take these steps, the nation must continue to pay the cost 
of such neglect of human welfare for a long time.
LOW ETHOS INTRODUCTION
Our speaker. Dale Jones, is a sophomore Chemistry 
student from Cleveland, Ohio. His subject today is the 
Farm Problem. Perhaps this surprises you as it surprised 
me. Since this is a new subject for him, one with which he 
is not as directly concerned as many of us, he thought we 
might be interested in his views about this problem. The 
title of the speech is "Making Sense about the Farm Problem."
Dale—
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HIGH ETHOS INTRODUCTION
We are indeed fortunate to have as our speaker Dr. E. 
Merrit Burdick. In turning to the current issue of Who's Who 
in America, I discovered that our distinguished speaker was 
b o m  and raised on a farm near Pontotoc, Mississippi, and re­
ceived his B.S. from Mississippi State University in 1925. 
Following his degree he worked in a variety of occupations 
relating to agriculture: as secretary of the Farm Bureau Fed­
eration in Mississippi, as a farm advisor for the State of 
Mississippi, and as a teacher. His work in teaching led to a 
social science research council fellowship in 1930, a Ricardo 
prize fellowship in 1931, and his Ph. D. in Agricultural 
Economics at Harvard in 1933.
Since that time he has been at the University of 
California in Berkely where he is Professor of Agricultural 
Economics, Director of Agricultural Research, and has the 
distinction of holding the Giannin Foundation Chair. Dr. 
Burdick has served in many professional associations and is 
past-president of the American Farm Economic Association.
In addition to his educational activities. Dr. Bur­
dick has served the government in numerous capacities : as ad­
visor to the Department of Agriculture, as a consultant on 
the Lend Lease Program, on Farm Credit Policies, and so forth. 
He is a fellow of the American Statistical Association and 
since 1939 has been an advisor to the Director of the Bureau 
of the Census.
One of his more outstanding contributions has been 
his work as research director for the 20th Century Fund Com­
mittee on American Agricultural Policy. Of his many pub­
lished books and articles on Agriculture, two of the more re­
cent were published by the 20th Century Fund: Farm Policies 
of the United States 1790-1950, in 1953, and Can We Solve the 
Farm Problem in 1955.
In view of all these diverse qualifications, there­
fore, 1 think we could find no better authority to speak to 
us on the subject, "Making Sense About the Farm Problem," 
Professor Burdick.
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APPENDIX C
MEASURING INSTRUMENTS
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DIRECTIONS FOR THE PILOT STUDIES OF THE INTRODUCTIONS
This spring we are conducting a series of experiments 
on persuasion. One of the problems we face is equating the 
impact of two introductions that we” must use. Therefore, I 
wish to play each one of these introductions and have you re­
act to them on the semantic differential and the question- 
aires which you have been given. On the semantic differen­
tial react to the concept printed at the top of the page 
after listening to the introduction of that speaker.
The middle or four position on the scale represents 
a "neutral" or a "don't know" or "doesn't apply" attitude 
toward the continuum presented by the two words. Then, mov­
ing out from the center, the three and five positions repre­
sents "slightly," and the two and six positions represent 
"quitej" and the one and seven represent "extremely." Thus, 
if you thought a speaker, for example, would be quite unfair, 
you would check space six on the fair-unfair scale; if ex­
tremely fair, you would check space one; if neutral, check 
the middle space.
The questionaire consists of a series of opinion 
statements. You are asked to indicate your agreement or dis­
agreement with the statements. Again, the middle or four 
position represents "neutral," the "slight," "moderate," and 
"strong" agreement or disagreement.
There are no right or wrong answers. Do not worry 
or puzzle over individual items; it is your first iaq>ressions, 
the immediate "feelings" about the items that we want.
Check your expectations of the speaker on this topic. 
Please do not try to guess what reactions we want, just re­
spond honestly.
Are there any questions?
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SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIAL 
"THE FARM PROBLEM"
FAIR: : : : :___ •'___ •'___ • UNFAIR
5 6 7
REASONABLE:___:_____:___ :___ :___ :___ :___ : UNREASONABLE
DISHONEST :__ :_____:___ :___ :___ :___ :___ • HONEST
UNSYMPATHETIC:____:___:____ :___ :___ :___ :___ : SYMPATHETIC
AGGRESSIVE :____:___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :___ : NON-AGGRESSIVE
U N I N T E R E S T I N G :____:___ :___ :___ :___ •___ : INTERESTING
ACTIVE:____:___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :___ : PASSIVE
GOOD:____:___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :--- *• BAD
FAST:____ :___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :___ : SLOW
IMMORAL:____:___ :___ :___ :___ :___ :___ : MORAL
WEAK: : : :___ :___ :___ :___ • STRONG
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#2 SCALE 
"THE FARM PROBLEM"
1. This person is not an expert on the farm problem.
AGREE:____:_____ :____:____:_____ :____ :____ : DISAGREE
2. This person is not well informed about the farm problem.
AGREE:____:_____ :____:____:_____ :____ :____ : DISAGREE
3. This person can speak with authority on the farm 
problem.
AGREE:____:_____ :____:____:_____ :____ :____ : DISAGREE
4. This person lacks personal experience with the farm 
problem.
AGREE:____:_____ :____:____:_____ :____ :____ : DISAGREE
5. This person deserves to be accepted as an authority on 
the farm problem.
AGREE:____:_____ :____:____:_____ :____ :____ : DISAGREE
6 . This person lacks adequate practical experience with 
the problem to be considered an authority.
AGREE :____:_____ :___ :____ :_____ :____ :____ : DISAGREE
7. One can place confidence in what this person says about 
the farm problem.
AGREE :____:_____ :____:____:_____ :____ :____ : DISAGREE
8 . By virtue of his education and training, this person 
speaks with authority on the farm problem.
AGREE:____:_____ :____:____:_____ :____ :____ : DISAGREE
9. This person probably spends considerable time thinking 
about the farm problem.
AGREE:____:_____ :____:____:_____ :____ :____ : DISAGREE
10. This person is a reliable source of information about 
the farm problem.
AGREE:____:_____ :____:____:_____ :____ :____ : DISAGREE
11. Because of his position, this person may be considered 
an authority on the farm problem.
AGREE: : : : : : : :  DISAGREE
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12. This person is a reliable source of information about 
the farm problem.
AGREE:_________:____ :____ :____ :____ :____ : DISAGREE
13. This person could accurately predict future develop­
ments concerning the farm problem.
AGREE:____ :____:_____:____ :____ :____:_____: DISAGREE
14. This person has broad knowledge of the farm problem.
AGREE:____ :____:_____:____ :____ :____:_____: DISAGREE
15. This person has studied the farm problem intensively.
AGREE:____ :____:_____:____ :____ :____:_____: DISAGREE
16. This person knows nothing about the historical develop­
ment of the farm problem.
AGREE:____ :____:_____:____ :____ :____:_____: DISAGREE
17. This person has had exceptional opportunities to le a m  
the truth about the farm problem.
AGREE:____ :____:_____:____ :____ :____:_____: DISAGREE
18. This person has read widely on the farm problem.
AGREE:____ :____: :____ :____ :____:_____: DISAGREE
19. Few people have access to better information about the 
farm problem than does this person.
AGREE :____ :____:_____:____ :____ :____:_____: DISAGREE
20. This person is not adequately prepared to analyze the 
farm problem.
AGREE: : : : : : : :  DISAGREE
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ATTITUDE SCALE ON PARITY PRICE SUPPORTS
TO THE READER:
You are being asked to take part in a project to 
create a scale to measure attitudes toward parity price sup­
ports for farm products. For this scale to be valid, the 
sincere cooperation of many individuals is needed.
You are asked to read a number of opinion statements 
presented in the following manner:
All college students should be exenqpt from the federal draft
Strongly Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly
Agree Disagree
Place an X on the one of the five blanks that most accurately 
describes your reaction to the statement.
Do not puzzle over any item; it is your immediate 
reaction that is desired. There are no established "right" 
or "wrong" answers.
Please give your reaction to every item. Average 
time for completing all items is about ten minutes.
DEFINITIONS: in order to clarify some of the opinion state­
ments on the succeeding pages, the following definitions are 
supplied:
Parity Price Support Program: This is a program
where a predetermined "fair" ratio of farm income to farm 
expenses is established by law. Farm income is then guaran­
teed at some percentage of this parity for the producers of 
certain farm products through government loans on or pur­
chases of these agricultural products. A program of this 
type is now in operation nationally.
Farm Problem: This general term includes such items
as the problem of declining average farm income, rising farm 
costs, and crop surpluses.
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1. A parity price support program is one of the best ways 
- to solve the farm problem.
Strongly Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly
agree disagree
2. A parity price support program is essential to the 
economic stability of the nation
Strongly Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly
agree disagree
3. The continuance of parity price supports will hinder the 
progress of agriculture.
Strongly Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly
agree disagree
4. A parity price support program is beneficial to the 
nation as a whole.
Strongly Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly
agree disagree
5. Parity price supports should be continued.
Strongly Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly
agree disagree
6 . The parity price support program aids the advancement of 
American agriculture.
Strongly Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly
agree disagree
7. Parity price supports are essential for a strong ihnerican 
agriculture.
Strongly Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly
agree disagree
8 . Parity price support programs limit the efficiency of 
agriculture.
Strongly Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly
agree disagree
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9. A parity price support program represents the best long­
term solution to the farm problem.
Strongly Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly 
agree disagree
10. A parity price support program is based upon unsound 
economic principles.
Strongly Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly
agree disagree
11. It is extremely unlikely that a parity price support 
program can solve the farm problem.
Strongly Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly
agree disagree
12. The principle of parity price supports for farm products 
is essentially sound.
Strongly Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly
agree disagree
13. Parity price supports for farm products are a necessity 
for the nation.
Strongly Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly
agree disagree
14. It is advisable for the nation to continue a program of 
parity price supports for farm products.
Strongly Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly
agree disagree
15. A parity price support program is harmful economically 
to the nation as a whole.
Strongly Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly
agree disagree
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16. Parity price support programs should be abandoned.
Strongly Agree Undecided Disagree Strongly
agree disagree
Thank you for your cooperation.
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INTRODUCTION TO THE HAINAN SCALE
This questionaire is part of a survey being conducted on 
this campus and is designed to obtain information about the 
attitudes and opinions of college students in a number of 
areas of concern.
This is neither an intelligence test nor an information test 
There are no "right" or "wrong" answers. The best answer is 
your own personal opinion. You can be sure that whatever 
your opinion may be on a particular subject, there will be 
many who will agree with you and many who will disagree.
It must be emphasized that the sponsors of this survey do 
not necessarily agree or disagree with the statements in it. 
We have tried to cover a great many points of view. We 
agree with some of the statements and disagree with others. 
Similarly, you will probably find yourself agreeing strongly 
with some statements, disagreeing just as strongly with 
others, and being, perhaps, more neutral about still others.
All that we ask of you is that you;
1. Read each statement carefully and mark it clearly 
according to your first reaction. It isn't necessary 
to take a lot of time for any one question. We have 
allotted about 10 seconds per question.
2. Answer every question.
3. Give your personal point of view. Don't talk over 
the questions with anyone. Avoid discussing this 
queStionaire outside this classroom as it will be 
given to others throughout this quarter.
4. Be as sincere, accurate, and complete as possible in 
the limited time we have.
5. If you find that your questionaire has a page missing 
or is not legible, please raise your hand and you 
will be helped.
6 . When you have finished, recheck the answers to make 
sure that you have confieted all of the questions. 
Then raise your hand and the questionaire will be 
picked up.
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The following are statements with which some people agree
and others disagree. Please mark each one in the left mar­
gin, according to the amount of your agreement or disagree­
ment, by using the following scale.
+3: strong agreement -1: slight disagreement
+2 : moderate agreement -2 : moderate disagreement
+1 ; slight agreement -3: strong disagreement
 1. Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a
worthwhile goal, it is unfortunately necessary to 
restrict the freedom of certain political groups.
 2. If people would talk less and work more, everybody
would be better off.
 3. Governments and communities should not set up cen­
sorship boards which can ban movies on the grounds 
of immorality.
 4. With our progress in education and communications,
the people of this world are more sympathetic with 
each other's needs, problems, and aspirations than 
ever before in history.
 5. A person should have a job that interests him and
work on it for its own sake, without regard for the 
importance or the recognition it will bring.
 6 . All teachers and government workers should be re­
quired to sign loyalty oaths swearing that they are 
not communists.
 7. No weakness or difficulty can hold us back if we
have enough will power.
 8 . The more intimately we get to know people we work
with, the more we are likely to respect them.
 9. It is difficult to believe that some people will go
to heaven and others to hell.
 10. Fundamentally, the world we live in is a pretty lone­
some place.
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11. Capital punishment (the death penalty) should be 
abolished.
12. Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas, but as
they grow up they ought to get^  over them and settle
down.
13. If the Voice of America is going to do a proper job
of conq)eting with Soviet propaganda for the friend­
ship of the uncommitted people of the world, it 
should avoid discussing such sore spots as the race 
question and concentrate on strong points such as 
our standard of living.
14. Of all the different philosophies which exist in 
this world, there is probably only one which is 
correct.
15. It is poor advice to tell a person who has a problem 
or worry that it is best not to think about it, but 
to keep busy with more cheerful things.
16. It makes little sense to treat homosexuals like 
criminals who deserve to be punished.
17. Christmas or Hanukah observance, Bible reading or 
other religious activities, should not take place in 
the public schools.
18. I believe that my confidence in my fellow man has 
• been justified more often than not.
_19. Obedience and respect for authority are the most 
important virtues children should leam.
20. Marriages between Christians and Jews should be 
strongly discouraged.
21. I sinçly can't bring myself to condemn people just 
because they seem greatly concerned with their own 
well-being.
22. People who can afford to dress according to prevail­
ing styles ought certainly to do so.
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 23. The necessity of appealing to masses of unthinking
voters justifies the widespread tendency of political 
campaigners to oversimplify issues and emphasize 
personalities.
 24. Artists and professors are just as important to
society as businessmen and manufacturers, if not 
more so.
 25. Most people don't realize how much of our lives are
controlled by plots hatched in secret places.
 26. A group which tolerates extreme differences of
opinion among its members cannot exist for long.
 27. Most people just don't know what's good for them.
 28. I have so much trouble finding out what is or is not
true that I can't understand how some people can 
feel so certain that they know the truth.
 29. There should be no efforts made to prevent Negroes
and Whites from living in the same neighborhood.
30 It is not important that people have complete faith 
in some supernatural power whose decisions they obey
without question
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This is the final page of the survey. Before you 
complete this page, please recheck your answers to make sure 
that you have answered all of the questions on the preceding 
pages.
Fill in the proper answers :
1. Age______
2. Sex (circle) M F
3. Classification (circle) Freshman Sophomore Junior 
Senior Graduate Special
4. Do you have a religious preference (circle) Yes No 
If the answer is yes, would you indicate what it is? 
(Specify denomination, if possible.)________________ _
3. Are you a member of a fraternity or a sorority? 
(circle) Yes No
If the answer is yes, would.you indicate what it is?
6 . Name of the course in which this survey was taken.
7. Do you have a political preference? (circle) Yes No 
If the answer is yes, would you indicate what it is?
8 . What do you plan to do after you have completed your 
education? Describe.
9. Name
10. If you have any comments to make about this 
questionaire, please make them below.
Thank you for your cooperation.
